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Abstract
Quantum theory (QT) has been confirmed by numerous experiments, yet
we still cannot fully grasp the meaning of the theory. As a consequence,
the quantum world appears to us paradoxical. Here we shed new light on
QT by having it follow from two main postulates (i) the theory should be
logically consistent; (ii) inferences in the theory should be computable in
polynomial time. The first postulate is what we require to each well-founded
mathematical theory. The computation postulate defines the physical com-
ponent of the theory. We show that the computation postulate is the only true
divide between QT, seen as a generalised theory of probability, and classi-
cal probability. All quantum paradoxes, and entanglement in particular, arise
from the clash of trying to reconcile a computationally intractable, somewhat
idealised, theory (classical physics) with a computationally tractable theory
(QT) or, in other words, from regarding physics as fundamental rather than
computation.
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1 Introduction
Quantum theory (QT) is one of the most fundamental, and accurate, mathematical
descriptions of our physical world. It dates back to the 1920s, and in spite of nearly
one century passed by since its inception, we do not have a clear understanding of
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such a theory yet. In particular, we cannot fully grasp the meaning of the theory:
why it is the way it is. As a consequence, we cannot come to terms with the many
paradoxes it appears to lead to — its so-called “quantum weirdness”.
This paper aims at finally explaining QT while giving a unified reason for its
many paradoxes. We pursue this goal by having QT follow from two main postu-
lates:
(Coherence) The theory should be logically consistent.
(Computation) Inferences in the theory should be computable in polynomial time.
The first postulate is what we essentially require to each well-founded mathe-
matical theory, be it physical or not: it has to be based on a few axioms and rules
from which we can unambiguously derive its mathematical truths. The second pos-
tulate will turn out to be central. It requires that there should be an efficient way to
execute the theory in a computer.
QT is an abstract theory that can be studied detached from its physical appli-
cations. For this reason, people often wonder which part of QT actually pertains
to physics. In our representation, the answer to this question shows itself natu-
rally: the computation postulate defines the physical component of the theory. But
it is actually stronger than that: it states that computation is more primitive than
physics.
Let us recall that QT is widely regarded as a “generalised” theory of probability.
In this paper we make the adjective “generalised” precise. In fact, our coherence
postulate leads to a theory of probability, in the sense that it disallows “Dutch
books”: this means, in gambling terms, that a bettor on a quantum experiment
cannot be made a sure loser by exploiting inconsistencies in their probabilistic
assessments. But probabilistic inference is in general NP-hard. By imposing the
additional postulate of computation, the theory becomes one of “computational
rationality”: one that is consistent (or coherent), up to the degree that polynomial
computation allows. This weaker, and hence more general, theory of probability is
QT.
As a result, for a subject living inside QT, all is coherent. For us, living in the
classical, and somewhat idealised, probabilistic world (not restricted by the com-
putation postulate), QT displays some inconsistencies: precisely those that cannot
be fixed in polynomial time. All quantum paradoxes, and entanglement in particu-
lar, arise from the clash of these two world views: i.e., from trying to reconcile an
unrestricted theory (i.e., classical physics) with a theory of computational rational-
ity (quantum theory). Or, in other words, from regarding physics as fundamental
rather than computation.
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But there is more to it. We show that the theory is “generalised” also in another
direction, as QT turns out to be a theory of “imprecise” probability: in fact, re-
quiring the computation postulate is similar to defining a probabilistic model using
only a finite number of moments; and therefore, implicitly, to defining the model
as the set of all probabilities compatible with the given moments. In QT, some of
these compatible probabilities can actually be signed, that is, they allow for “neg-
ative probabilities”. In our setting, these have no meaning per se, they are just a
mathematical consequence of polynomially bounded coherence (or rationality).
1.1 Relations with the literature
Since its foundation, there have been two main ways to explain the differences
between QT and classical probability. The first one, that goes back to Birkhoff
and von Neumann [1], explains this differences with the premise that, in QT, the
Boolean algebra of events is taken over by the “quantum logic” of projection op-
erators on a Hilbert space. The second one is based on the view that the quantum-
classical clash is due to the appearance of negative probabilities [2].
Recently, there has been a research effort, the so-called “quantum reconstruc-
tion”, which amounts to trying to rebuild the theory from more primitive postulates.
The search for alternative axiomatisations of QT has been approached following
different avenues: extending Boolean logic [1, 3, 4], using operational primitives
[5, 6, 7, 8], using information-theoretic postulates [7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15],
building upon the subjective foundation of probability [16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21,
22, 23, 24, 25, 26] and starting from the phenomenon of quantum nonlocality
[7, 10, 11, 27, 28].
A common trait of all these approaches is that of regarding QT as a gener-
alised theory of probability. But why is probability generalised in such a way, and
what does it mean? Our paper appears to be the first to show that the answer to
this question rests in the computational intractability of classical probability theory
contrasted to the polynomial-time complexity of QT.
Note that there have been previous investigations into the computational na-
ture of QT but they have mostly focused on topics of undecidability and of poten-
tial computational advantages of non-standard theories involving modifications of
quantum theory [29, 30, 31, 32].1
1The undecidability results in QT are usually obtained via a limiting argument, as the number of
particles goes to infinity (see, e.g., [33]). These results do not apply to our setting as we rather take
the stance that the Universe is a finite physical system.
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1.2 Outline of the paper
Section 2 is concerned with the coherence principle. We recall how Bayesian prob-
ability can be derived (via mathematical duality) from a set of logical axioms. Ad-
dressing self-consistency (coherence or rationality) in such a setting is a standard
task in logic; in practice, it reduces to prove that a certain real-valued bounded
function is non-negative.
Section 3 details the computation principle. We consider the problem of ver-
ifying the non-negativity of a function as above. This problem is generally unde-
cidable or, when decidable, NP-hard. We make the problem polynomially solvable
by redefining the meaning of (non-)negativity. We give our fundamental theo-
rem (Theorem 2) showing that the redefinition is at the heart of the clash between
Bayesian probability and computational rationality.
We show in Section 4 that QT is a special instance of computational rationality
and hence that Theorem 2 is not only the sole difference between quantum and
classical probability, but also the distinctive reason for all quantum paradoxes; this
latter part is discussed in Section 5. In particular, to give further insight about
the quantum-classical clash, in Section 5.2 we reconsider the question of local
realism in the light of computational rationality; in Section 5.3 we show that the
witness function, in the fundamental “entanglement witness theorem”, is nothing
else than a negative function whose negativity cannot be assessed in polynomial
time—whence it is not “negative” in QT.
Moreover, using Theorem 2, in Section 6 we devise an example of a compu-
tationally tractable theory of probability that is unrelated to QT but that admits
entangled states. This shows in addition that the “quantum logic” and the “quasi-
probability” foundations of QT are two faces of the same coin, being natural con-
sequences of the computation principle.
We finally discuss the results in Section 7. The technical proofs of the paper
are in Appendix.
2 Desirability
2.1 Coherence postulate
De Finetti’s subjective foundation of probability [34] is based on the notion of
rationality (self-consistency or coherence). This approach has then been further
developed in [35, 36], giving rise to the so-called theory of desirable gambles
(TDG).2 In this setting probability is a derived notion in the sense that it can be
2Contrarily to what it may seem, TDG is not an “exotic” theory of probability; loosely speaking,
it is just an equivalent reformulation of the well-known Bayesian decision theory (a` la Anscombe-
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inferred via mathematical duality from a set of logical axioms that one can inter-
pret as rationality requirement in the way a subject, let us call her Alice, accepts
gambles on the results of an uncertain experiment. It goes as follow.
Let Ω denote the possibility space of an experiment (e.g., {Head,Tail} or Cn
in QT). A gamble g on Ω is a bounded real-valued function of Ω, interpreted as
an uncertain reward. It plays the traditional role of variables or, using a physical
parlance, of observables. In the context we are considering, accepting a gamble g
by an agent is regarded as a commitment to receive, or pay (depending on the sign),
g(Ω) utiles3 whenever Ω occurs. Given this view, if byL we denote the set of all
the gambles on Ω, the subset of all non-negative gambles, that is, of gambles for
which Alice is never expected to lose utiles, is given byL ≥ := {g∈L : infg≥ 0}.
Analogously, negative gambles, those gambles for which Alice will certainly lose
some utiles, even an epsilon, is defined as L < := {g ∈L : supg < 0}. In what
follows, with G ⊂L we denote a finite4 set of gambles that Alice finds desirable:
these are the gambles that she is willing to accept and thus commits herself to the
corresponding transactions.
The crucial question is now to provide a criterion for a set G of gambles repre-
senting assessments of desirability to be called rational. Intuitively Alice is ratio-
nal if she avoids sure losses: that is, if, by considering the implications of what she
finds desirable, she is not forced to find desirable a negative gamble. This postulate
of rationality is called “no arbitrage” in economics and “no Dutch book” in the
subjective foundation of probability. In TDG we formulate it thorough the notion
of logical coherence which, despite the informal interpretation given above, is a
purely syntactical (structural) notion. To show this, we need to define an appropri-
ate logical calculus, that is, the tautologies and the inference rules (characterising
the set of gambles that Alice must find desirable as a consequence of having de-
sired G in the first place), and based on it to characterise the family of consistent
sets of assessments..
Given that non-negative gambles may increase Alice’s utility without ever de-
creasing it, we have that:
A0. L ≥ should always be desirable.
This defines the tautologies of the calculus. We thus characterise the set of gambles
that we must find desirable as a consequence of having desired G in the first place,
that is its the deductive closure of a set G . Those gambles are the conical hull
of gambles in G . Indeed, whenever f ,g are desirable for Alice, then any positive
Aumann [37]) once this is extended to deal with incomplete preferences [38, 39].
3Abstract units of utility, indicating the satisfaction derived from an economic transaction; we
can approximately identify it with money provided we deal with small amounts of it [40, Sec. 3.2.5].
4We will comment on the case when G may not be finite.
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linear combination of them should also be desirable (this amounts to assuming that
Alice has a linear utility scale, which is a standard assumption in probability):
posi(G ) :=
{
h ∈L : h =
`
∑
i=1
λigi with λi ≥ 0, gi ∈ G , ` ∈ N
}
. (1)
Moreover, we can assume that if Alice find all gambles of type g+ ε desirable, for
any arbitrary small positive ε , then she should also find g desirable. This means
that the actual deductive closure we are after is given by the map N associating to
G the set:
A1. N(G ) := clposi(L ≥∪G ).
where cl is the topological closure operator given the supremum norm topology on
L . The set N(G ) is the smallest closed convex cone that includesL ≥∪G , and it
is called the natural extension of G , and sometimes is simply denoted byK . Note
thatK = posi(L ≥∪G ) whenever G is finite.
In a betting system, a sure loss for an agent is represented by a negative gamble.
Indeed, whenever the outcome of the experiment may be, accepting g∈L < means
to accept to pay some non zero utiles. We therefore say that:
Definition 1 (Coherence postulate). A set K of desirable gambles is coherent if
and only if
A2. L <∩K = /0.
As simple as it looks, expression A2 alone captures the coherence postulate as
formulate in the introduction in case of classical probability theory. This will be
make precise in Section 2.3.
The following result, in addition to providing a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for coherence, states that−1 can be regarded as playing the role of the Falsum
and A2 can be reformulated as−1 /∈K . Note that. we have introduced the symbol
1 to distinguish the unitary function in L , i.e., 1(ω) = 1 for all ω ∈ Ω, from the
scalar (real number) 1. This will be convenient later in Section 3. It is an immediate
consequence of Theorem 3.8.5 and Claim 3.7.4 in [41].
Proposition 1. Let G be a set of gambles. The following claims are equivalent
1. N(G ) is coherent,
2. posi(G )∩L < = /0,
3. −1 /∈ posi(G ∪L ≥),
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4. g /∈ N(G ), for some gamble g.
Postulate A2, which presupposes postulates A0 and A1, provides the normative
definition of TDG, referred to by T . Based on it, in Subsection 2.3 we derive
the axioms of classical, Bayesian, probability theory. This is simply based on
the fact that, geometrically, K is a closed convex cone. It is thence clear from
the above definition that L ≥ is the minimal coherent set of desirable gambles.
It characterises a state of full ignorance – a subject without knowledge about ω
should only accept nonnegative gambles. Conversely, a coherent set of desirable
gambles is called maximal if there is no other coherent set of desirable gambles
including it. In terms of rationality, a maximal coherent set of desirable gambles
is a set of gambles that Alice cannot extend by accepting other gambles while
keeping at the same time rationality. It also represents a situation in which Alice
is sure about the state of the system, as we will show in the next examples and
section.
Example 1. Let us consider the toss of a fair coin Ω= {Head,Tail}. A gamble g
in this case has two components g(Head) = g1 and g(Tail) = g2. If Alice accepts
g then she commits herself to receive/pay g1 if the outcome is Heads and g2 if Tails.
Since a gamble is in this case an element of R2, g = (g1,g2), we can plot the gam-
bles Alice accepts in a 2D coordinate system with coordinate g1 and g2, see Figure
1. A0 says that Alice is willing to accept any gamble g = (g1,g2) that, no matter
the result of the experiment, may increase her wealth without ever decreasing it,
that is with gi ≥ 0 – Alice always accepts the first quadrant, Figure 1(a). Simi-
larly. Alice does not accept any gamble g = (g1,g2) that will surely decrease her
wealth, that is with gi < 0 (this follows by A2). In other words, Alice always does
not accept the interior of the third quadrant, Figure 1(b). Then we ask Alice about
g = (−0.1,1) – she loses 0.1 if Heads and wins 1 if Tails. Since Alice knows that
the coin is fair, she accepts this gamble as well as all the gambles of the form λg
with λ > 0, because this is just a “change of currency” (scaling). Similarly, she
accepts all the gambles g+h for any h ∈L +, since these gambles are even more
favourable for her (additivity). Scaling and additivity follow by A1.
Now, we can ask Alice about g = (1,−0.1) and the argument is symmetric to
the above case. We therefore obtain the following set of desirable gambles (see
Figure 1(c)): K2 = {g ∈ R2 | 10g1 + g2 ≥ 0 and g1 + 10g2 ≥ 0}. Finally, we can
ask Alice about g = (−1,1) – she loses 1 if Heads and wins 1 if Tails. Since the
coin is fair, Alice accepts this gamble. A similar conclusion can be derived for the
symmetric gamble g = (1,−1). Figure 1(d) is her final set of desirable gambles
about the experiment concerned with the toss of a fair coin, which in a formula be-
comesK3 = {g ∈ R2 | g1+g2 ≥ 0}. The resulting closed convex cone is maximal.
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(a)
g1
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g1
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(d)
Figure 1: Alice’s sets of coherent set of desirable gambles for the experiment of
tossing a fair coin.
Alice does not accept any other gamble. In fact, if Alice would also accept for in-
stance h = (−2,0.5) then, since she has also accepted g = (1.5,−1), i.e., g ∈K3,
she must also accept g+h (because of A1). However, g+h = (−0.5,−0.5) is al-
ways negative, Alice always loses utiles in this case. In other words, by accepting
h = (−2,0.5) Alice incurs a sure loss – she is irrational (A2 does not hold).
2.2 Inference
In the operational interpretation of T , agents can buy/sell gambles from/to each
other. Therefore, an agent must be able to determine the selling/buying prices for
gambles. This can be formulated as an inference procedure onK . For simplicity,
we consider finite sets of assessments, and denote by |A| the cardinality of a finite
set A.
Definition 2. Let G be a finite set of assessments of desirability, and N(G ) be a
coherent set of desirable gambles. Given f ∈L , we denote with
E( f ) := sup
γ0∈R,λi∈R+
γ0
s.t :
f (ω)− γ0−
|G |
∑
i=1
λigi(ω)≥ 0 ∀ω ∈Ω,
(2)
the lower prevision of f . The upper prevision of f is equal to E( f ) =−E(− f ).
The lower prevision of a gamble is Alice’s supremum buying price for f , i.e.,
how much she should pay to buy the gamble f . The upper prevision is Alice’s
infimum selling price for f , i.e., how much she should ask to sell the gamble f . We
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will show in Section 2.3 that the lower and upper prevision are just the lower and
upper expectation for the gamble f . By exploiting (1)–(A1), we can equivalently
rewrite (2) as:
E( f ) = sup
γ0∈R,λi∈R+
γ0
s.t :
f − γ01−
|G |
∑
i=1
λigi ∈L ≥,
(3)
or equivalently,
E( f ) = sup
γ0∈R
γ0 s.t. f − γ01 ∈ N(G ). (4)
In other words, we have expressed the constraint in the above optimisation prob-
lems as a membership.
Example 2. Let us consider again the coin example and the set of assessments
G = {g1 = (−1,1),g2 = (1,−1)}. It can be verified that N(G ) coincides with the
maximal closed convex cone in Figure 1(d). In this case, the lower prevision for the
gamble f = (0,1) is E( f ) = 12 and it is equal to the upper prevision. For maximal
coherent set of desirable gambles, lower and upper previsions always coincide.
If Alice had accepted only the gambles G = {g1 = (−0.1,1),g2 = (1,−0.1)} re-
sulting in the closed convex cone of Figure 1(c), then the lower prevision for the
gamble f would be E( f )≈ 0.09 and the upper prevision E( f )≈ 0.91.
Having defined lower and upper previsions, we can better understand A2. A2
can be formulated as the following decision problem
∃λi ≥ 0 s.t.
|G|
∑
i=1
λigi(ω)< 0, ∀ω ∈Ω, (5)
there exists a combination of Alice’s desirable gambles that is negative. Let us
assume such λ ∗i exist, that is ∑
|G|
i=1λ
∗
i gi < 0. Then another agent, Bob, could sell
to Alice the gambles λ ∗i gi and she would accept them because gi is desirable to
her and so λ ∗i gi (by A1). Overall Bob would give away −∑|G|i=1λ ∗i gi. However,
since −∑|G|i=1λ ∗i gi > 0 ∀ω ∈ Ω, he actually gains utiles no matter the result of the
experiment. Bob’s gain is equivalent to Alice’s loss (∑|G|i=1λ
∗
i gi), hence Alice can
be used as a money pump.5 In Economics, such situation is called an arbitrage,
while in the subjective definition of probability is called a Dutch book.
5By A1, Alice would also accept the gambles γλ ∗i gi for γ > 1 allowing Bob to multiply his gain
of γ .
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Hence, finally we notice that, by Equation (3) and Proposition 1, the problem
of checking whetherK is coherent (the coherence problem) can be formulated as
the following decision problem:
∃λi ≥ 0 :−1−
|G |
∑
i=1
λigi ∈L ≥. (6)
If the answer is “yes”, then the gamble −1 belongs to K , proving K ’s incoher-
ence. The coherence problem therefore also reduces to the problem of evaluating
the nonnegativity of a function in the considered space (let us call this problem the
“nonnegativity decision problem”).
2.3 Probabilistic interpretation thorough duality
The aim of this Section is to provide a natural probabilistic interpretation to the the-
ory of desirable gamblesT . This is done by showing a stronger result, namely that
the dual of a coherent set of desirable gambles is a closed convex set of probability
charges:
P =
{
µ ∈M≥ :
∫
1dµ = 1,
∫
gdµ ≥ 0, ∀g ∈K
}
, (7)
where M≥ is the set of nonnegative charges. Observe that the term “charge” is
used in Analysis to denote a finitely additive set function [42, Ch.11]. Conversely
a measure is a countably additive set function. In this paper we use charges to be
more general, but this does not really matter for the results about QT that we are
going to present later on.
The key point in the duality proof is thatL ≥ (the set of all nonegative gambles
(real-valued bounded function) on Ω) includes indicator functions.6 This is crucial
to prove that the dual ofK is always included inM≥. We will see in the next sec-
tions that when this is not the case, the dual of a coherent set of desirable gambles
is not anymore a convex set of probabilities.
Note that, equipped with the supremum norm, L constitutes a Banach space,
and its topological dual L ∗ is the space of all bounded functionals on it. We
assume the weak∗ topology onL ∗.
Let A be the algebra of subsets of Ω and µ :A → [−∞,∞] denotes a charge:
that is µ is a finitely additive set function of A [42, Ch.11], [43], that can take
positive and negative values. We have that every gamble on L is integrable with
6An indicator function defined on a subset A⊆Ω is a function that is equal to one for all elements
in A and 0 for all elements outside A.
11
respect to any finite charge [42, Th.11.8]. Therefore, for any gamble g and finite
charge µ we can define
∫
gdµ , which we can interpret as a linear functional L(·) :=
〈·,µ〉 on g. We denote byM the set of all finite charges onL and byM≥ the set
of nonnegative charges. M is isometrically isomorphic toL ∗. The duality bracket
betweenL andM is given by 〈 f ,µ〉 := ∫ f dµ , with f ∈L and µ ∈M .
A linear functional L of gambles is said to be nonnegative whenever it sat-
isfies : L(g) ≥ 0, for g ∈ L ≥. A nonnegative linear functional is called a state
if moreover it preserves the unitary constant gamble. In our context, this means
L(1) = 〈1,µ〉 = ∫ 1dµ = 1, i.e., the linear functional is scale preserving. Hence,
the set of states S corresponds to the closed convex set of all probability charges.
We define the dual of a subsetK ofL as:
K • =
{
µ ∈M :
∫
gdµ ≥ 0, ∀g ∈K
}
. (8)
Proposition 2. The dual of L coincides with {0}, whereas the dual of L ≥ is the
set of nonnegative chargesM≥.
Since (·)• is an anti-monotonic operation on the complete lattice of subsets of
L , the dual of any coherent set of desirable gambles is a closed convex cone in
between those two extremes. Can they be characterised in some way? It actually
turns out that the dual of a coherent set of desirable gambles can be completely
described in terms of a (closed convex) set of states (probability charges). More
precisely, we have that:7
Theorem 1. The map
K 7→P :=K •∩S
establishes a bijection between coherent sets of desirable gambles and non-empty
closed convex sets of states.
This means that we can write the dual ofK as the set
P =
{
µ ∈ S : Lµ(g)≥ 0, ∀g ∈K
}
, (9)
which is a closed convex-set of probability charges. We have derived the axioms
of probability—a non-negative function that integrates to one—from the the co-
herence postulate A2. Hence, as we are going to see at the end of this subsection,
whenever an agent is coherent, Equation (9) states that desirability corresponds to
non-negative expectation (for all probabilities in P). When K is incoherent, P
turns out to be empty—there is no probability compatible with the assessments in
7All proofs can be found in the Appendix
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K . It is thus form this perspective that it has to be understood the claim that ex-
pression A2 alone captures the coherence postulate as formulate in the introduction
in case of classical probability theory, and thus that the latter follows from it.
As an immediate corollary of the Theorem 1, to say that a closed convex cone
is coherent is equivalent to say that its dual is a closed convex subset of states.
As already mentioned, once we have defined the duality between TDG and
probability theory, we can immediately reformulate the lower and upper previsions
by means of probabilities. Indeed, let G be a finite set of assessments, and K :=
N(G ) be a coherent set of desirable gambles. Given f ∈L , the lower prevision of
f defined in Equation (2) can also be computed as:
E( f ) := inf
µ∈S
∫
Ω
f (ω)dµ
s.t :∫
Ω
gi(ω)dµ ≥ 0,∀ gi ∈ G .
(10)
which is equivalent to
E( f ) := inf
µ∈P
∫
Ω
f (ω)dµ. (11)
The upper prevision of f is defined E( f ) =−E(− f ).
Hence, the lower and upper prevision of f w.r.t.K are just the lower and upper
expectation of f w.r.t. P . In case K is maximal, then P includes only a single
probability and, therefore, in this case:
E( f ) = E( f ) = E( f ).
That is, the solution of (10) coincides with the expectation of f . We have consid-
ered the more general case E( f )≤ E( f ) because, as we will discuss in Section 4.3,
QT is a theory of “imprecise” probability [36].8
3 Taking computational complexity seriously
We have seen in Section 2.2 that the problem of checking whether or not K is
coherent can be formulated as the following decision problem:
∃λi ≥ 0 :−1−
|G |
∑
i=1
λigi ∈L ≥. (12)
8The term “imprecise” refers to the fact that the closed convex setP may not be a singleton, that
is the probability may not be “precisely” specified. Imprecise probability theory is also referred as
robust Bayesian.
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If the answer is “yes”, then the gamble −1 belongs to K , proving K ’s incoher-
ence. Moreover, any inference task can ultimately be reduced to a problem of the
form (12), see Section 2.2. Hence, the above decision problem unveils a crucial
fact: the hardness of inference in classical probability corresponds to the hardness
of evaluating the non-negativity of a function in the considered space (let us call
this the “non-negativity decision problem”).
When Ω is infinite (in this paper we consider the case Ω⊂Cn) and for generic
functions, the non-negativity decision problem is undecidable. To avoid such an
issue, we may impose restrictions on the class of allowed gambles and thus define
T on a appropriate subspaceLR ofL .9 For instance, instead ofL , we may con-
siderLR: the class of multivariate polynomials of degree at most d (we denote by
L ≥R ⊂LR the subset of non-negative polynomials and by L <R ⊂LR the negative
ones). In doing so, by Tarski-Seidenberg quantifier elimination theory [44, 45],
the decision problem becomes decidable, but still intractable, being in general NP-
hard. If we accept the so-called “Exponential Time Hypothesis” (that P 6=NP) and
we require that inference should be tractable (in P), we are stuck. What to do?
A solution is to change the meaning of “being non-negative” for a function by
considering a subset Σ≥ (L ≥R for which the membership problem in (12) is in P.
In other words, a computationally efficient TDG, which we denote by T ?,
should be based on a logical redefinition of the tautologies, i.e., by stating that
B0. Σ≥ should always be desirable,
in the place of A0. The rest of the theory can develop following the footprints of
the original theory. In particular, the deductive closure for is T ? is defined by:
B1. NB(G ) := clposi(Σ≥∪G ).
And sometimes we denote NB(G ) by C . Again, C = posi(Σ≥∪G ) for finite G .
Finally, the coherence postulate, which now naturally encompasses the com-
putation postulate, states that:
Definition 3 (P-coherence). A set C of desirable gambles is P-coherent if and only
if
B2. Σ<∩C = /0.
9The point is that we want T defined on LR to coincide with the restriction to LR of T when
defined onL . Given this property, we are then assured that the dual of a coherent setKR inLR can
be identified with the dual of its deductive closure inL , i.e. with the closed convex set of probability
charges (N(KR))•. In Appendix B we make the construction and claims precise.
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Above we called P-coherent a set C that satisfies B2 since, whenever Σ≥ con-
tains all positive constant gambles, its incoherence can be verified in polynomial
time by solving:10
∃λi ≥ 0 such that −1R−
|G |
∑
i=1
λigi ∈ Σ≥, (13)
where 1R denotes the unitary gamble inLR, i.e., 1R(ω) = 1 for all ω ∈Ω. Hence,
T ? andT (defined overLR) have the same deductive apparatus; they just possibly
differ in the considered set of tautologies, and thus in their (in)consistencies, as we
only ask Alice to always accept gambles for which she can efficiently determine
the nonnegativity (P-nonnegative gambles) and to never accept gambles for which
she can efficiently determine the negativity (P-negative gambles).
3.1 Computationally efficient coherence and its consequences
Interestingly, we can associate a “probabilistic” interpretation as before to the cal-
culus defined by B0–B2 by computing the dual of a P-coherent set.
Since LR is a topological vector space, we can consider its dual space L ∗R of
all bounded linear functionals LB :LR→ R. Hence, with the additional condition
that linear functional preserves the unitary gamble (LB(1R) = 1), the dual cone of
a P-coherent C ⊂LR is given by
C ◦ = {LB ∈L ∗R | LB(g)≥ 0, LB(1R) = 1, ∀g ∈ C } . (14)
Analogously to the previous cases, we call states the elements of the following
closed convex set of linear functionals:
SB =
{
LB ∈L ∗R | LB(g)≥ 0, LB(1R) = 1, ∀g ∈ Σ≥
}
. (15)
Hence, we can rewrite the dual C ◦ as
C ◦ = {LB ∈ SB | LB(g)≥ 0, ∀g ∈ C } . (16)
ToC ◦ we can then associate its extensionC • inM , that is, the set of all charges
on Ω extending an element in C ◦. In general however this set does not yield a
classical probabilistic interpretation to T ?. This is because, whenever Σ< (L <R ,
there are negative gambles that cannot be proved to be negative in polynomial time.
Theorem 2. Assume that Σ≥ includes all positive constant gambles and that it
is closed (in LR). Let C ⊆ LR be a P-coherent set of desirable gambles. The
following statements are equivalent:
10For a justification of the non computational part of this claim, see Proposition 9.
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1. C includes a negative gamble that is not in Σ<.
2. posi(L ≥∪G ) is incoherent, and thusP is empty
3. C ◦ is not (the restriction toLR of) a closed convex set of mixtures of classical
evaluation functionals.
4. The extension C • of C ◦ in the space M of all charges in Ω includes only
signed ones (negative-probabilities).
Theorem 2 is the central result of this paper. It states that whenever C includes
a negative gamble (item 1), there is no classical probabilistic interpretation for it
(item 2). The other points suggest alternatives solutions to overcome this deadlock:
either to change the notion of evaluation functional (item 3) or to use negative-
probabilities as a means for interpreting T ? (item 4).
Let us clarify item 3 above. In doing so, we introduce some terminology. Re-
call that S is the collection of states (probability charges), that is of all nonnegative
linear functionals onL that preserve the unitary constant gamble. The extremes of
S are the so-called atomic charges (Dirac’s delta), that is the functional eω˜ assigning
1 to some given ω˜ and 0 elsewhere. The linear functional L(g) = 〈g,eω˜〉 = g(ω˜)
defined by an atomic charge eω˜ is a classical evaluation function – it evaluates the
function g at ω˜ . By Krein-Milman Theorem each state µ ∈ S is a convex combi-
nation of atomic charges, or (when the space is not finite) a limit of such combi-
nations. Hence, the linear functional induced by a state µ is a convex combination
(mixture) of classical evaluation functions, or a limit of such combinations. Recall
that any positive functional on LR can be extended (possibly non uniquely) to a
positive functional on L and that the restriction to LR of a positive functional on
L is a positive functional onLR. Hence, since C • includes charges (that are only
affine combinations of classical evaluation functions), its restriction to LR cannot
be a closed convex set of mixtures of classical evaluation functions. This is the last
statement of the last result.
Implicitly, Theorem 2 is also informing us on the properties of SB. Indeed, the
fact that there is a P-coherent set C that includes a negative gamble that is not P-
negative, yields that Σ≥ (L ≥, and therefore (Σ≥)• ) (L ≥)•. As a consequence,
the extremes of SB are in general only affine combinations of classical evaluation
functions.
In the next section, we show that Quantum Theory is a paradigmatic instance
of T ?. Given this, Theorem 2 applies and it turns out to be the key to explains
the weirdness of the microscopic world from the perspective of an external classic
observer. However, before doing that, we briefly discuss inference in P-coherent
theories.
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3.2 Inference in P-coherent theories
In this subsection, we compare inference in theory T ∗ with inference in the clas-
sical theory T .
Let G be a finite set of assessment in LR, and C = NB(G ) = posi(G ∪Σ≥) be
the corresponding P-coherent set of desirable gambles in T ∗. The lower prevision
of a gamble f ∈LR is defined as
EB( f ) := sup
γ0∈R,λi∈R+
γ0
s.t :
f − γ01R−
|G |
∑
i=1
λigi ∈ Σ≥.
(17)
The upper prevision as EB( f ) =−EB(− f ). Comparing (3) and (17), the reader can
notice that f − γ01−∑|G |i=1λigi ∈L ≥ in (3) becomes f − γ01R−∑|G |i=1λigi ∈ Σ≥ in
(17).
Note that, by definition of Σ≥, the membership of f − γ01R−∑|G |i=1λigi to Σ≥
can be evaluated in polynomial-time (its complexity class is P).
Since Σ≥ 6=L ≥∩LR, C may not be coherent (in T ), we therefore have that,
for every f ∈LR
T ∗
EB( f ) ≤
T
E( f ) ≤
T
E( f ) ≤
T ∗
EB( f ), (18)
meaning that EB( f ) cannot always be interpreted as a lower expectation. We claim
that (18) is just a general formulation of so-called Bell-type inequalities in QT.
4 Coherence model for a quantum experiment
The aim of this section is to write down the gambling system for a quantum me-
chanics experiment. Since in QT any real-valued quantum observable is described
by a Hermitian operator, this naturally defines a vector subspace of gambles LR.
We will then show that evaluating the nonnegativity of a gamble inLR is not com-
putationally efficient. This will lead us to define a P-coherence postulate in LR
and, thus, via duality, to derive the first postulate of QT
Associated to any isolated physical system is a complex vector space
with inner product (that is, a Hilbert space) known as the state space of
the system. The system is completely described by its density operator,
which is a positive operator ρ with trace one, acting on the state space
of the system.
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In the last subsection we thus briefly discuss the case of all other axioms, and
how to derive them.
4.1 Space of gambles in QT
Consider first a single particle system with n-degrees of freedom and let Cn be the
n-dimensional complex unit-sphere, i.e.,:
Cn := {x ∈ Cn : x†x = 1}.
We can interpret an element x˜ ∈ Cn as “input data” for some classical prepa-
ration procedure. For instance, in the case of the spin-1/2 particle (n = 2), if
θ = [θ1,θ2,θ3] is the direction of a filter in the Stern-Gerlarch experiment, then x˜
is its one-to-one mapping into C2 (apart from a phase term). For spin greater than
1/2, the variable x˜ ∈ Cn associated to the preparation procedure cannot directly be
interpreted in terms only of “filter direction”. Nevertheless, at least on the formal
level, x˜ plays the role of a “hidden variable” in our model. Two vectors x˜, x˜′ corre-
spond to the same preparation procedure if x˜′ = δ x˜ with δ ∈C and |δ |= 1 (phase).
Cn will therefore plays the role of the phase space (the possibility space Ω) and x˜
of the “hidden-variable”. This hidden-variable model for QT is also discussed in
[46, Sec. 1.7], where the author explains why this model does not contradict the
existing “no-go” theorems for hidden-variables, see also Section 7.3.
In QT any real-valued observable is described by a Hermitian operator. This
naturally imposes restrictions on the type of functions g in (12):
g(x) = x†Gx,
where x ∈ Ω and G ∈H n×n, with H n×n being the set of Hermitian matrices of
dimension n× n. Since G is Hermitian and x is bounded (x†x = 1), g is a real-
valued bounded function (a gamble). By using the bra-ket notation, a gamble is
thus g(x) = 〈x|G|x〉.
As before, Alice’s acceptance of a gamble depends on her beliefs (uncertainty)
about the preparation procedure.
More generally, we can consider composite systems of m particles each one
with n j degrees of freedom. The corresponding possibility space is the cartesian
product of the systems
Ω=
m
∏
j=1
Cn j ,
whereas gambles are of the form
g(x1, . . . ,xm) = (⊗mj=1x j)†G(⊗mj=1x j), (19)
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with G ∈H n×n, n = ∏mj=1 n j and where ⊗ denotes the tensor product between
vectors, seen as column matrices.
The justification for the use of the tensor product in composite systems is the
following (for a more in depth discussed see Section 7.4). In the theory of desirable
gambles, structural judgements such as independence, corresponds to the product
of gambles on the single variables. In the specific case we are considering, they
have the form ∏mj=1 x
†
jG jx j. Now, it is not difficult to verify that such product is
mathematically the same as (⊗mj=1x j)†(⊗mj=1G j)(⊗mj=1x j). By closing the set of
product gambles under the operations of addition and scalar (real number) mul-
tiplication, we get the vector space whose domain coincide with the collection of
gambles of the form as in (19). Hence, in the setting under consideration, the tensor
product is ultimately a derived notion, not a primitive one.
For m = 1 (a single particle), evaluating the non-negativity of the quadratic
form x†Gx boils down to checking whether the matrix G is Positive Semi-Definite
(PSD) and therefore can be performed in polynomial time. This is no longer true
for m ≥ 2: indeed, in this case there exist polynomials of type (19) that are non-
negative, but whose matrix G is indefinite (it has at least one negative eigenvalue).
Moreover, it turns out that problem (12) is not tractable:
Proposition 3. The problem of checking the nonnegativity of g(x1, . . . ,xm) in (19)
is NP-hard for m≥ 2.
This result was proven by [47] for Hermitian biquadratic forms and by [48] in
the real valued case.
Example 3. Consider the following polynomial g(x1,x2) of m = 2 complex vari-
ables of dimension n = 2, x1 = [x11,x12]T and x2 = [x21,x22]T
2x11x
†
11x22x
†
22− x11x†12x21x†22− x11x†12y†1y2− x†11x12x21x†22− x†11x12y†1y2+2x12x†12x21y†1.
We have that g(x1,x2) is nonnegative in C
4
(it will be verified later), but it cannot
be written as (x1⊗ x2)†G(x1⊗ x2) with G≥ 0 (PSD).
4.2 QT as computational rationality
We have seen that the problem of checking the nonnegativity of a quadratic forms
is in general a NP-hard problem. What to do? As discussed previously, a solution is
to change the meaning of “being non-negative” by considering a subset Σ≥ (L ≥
for which the membership problem, and thus (12), is in P.
For functions of type (19), we can extend the notion of non-negativity that
holds for a single particle to m > 1 particles:
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Σ≥ := {g(x1, . . . ,xm) = (⊗mj=1x j)†G(⊗mj=1x j) : G≥ 0}.
That is, the function is “non-negative” (P-nonnegative) whenever G is PSD. P-
nonnegative gambles are also called Hermitian sum-of-squares (see e.g. [49]). We
will discuss about sum-of-squares polynomials in Sections 7.2 and 7.6. Observe
that, in Σ≥ the non-negative constant functions have the form
g(x1, . . . ,xm) = c1R(x1, . . . ,xm)
with c≥ 0 and
1R(x1, . . . ,xm) = (⊗mj=1x j)†I(⊗mj=1x j),
being the unitary gamble.
Similarly, a gamble g is P-negative whenever G is Negative-Definite (ND), that
is:
Σ< = {g(x1, . . . ,xm) = (⊗mj=1x j)†G(⊗mj=1x j) : G < 0}. (20)
We therefore can formulate postulates B0-B2, and thus in particular that C is a
P-coherent set of desirable gambles whenever Σ<∩C = /0.
In the following subsections, we are thence going to show how QT can be de-
rived from this “computational rationality” model and how all paradoxes of QT
can be explained as a consequence of P-coherence. Hence again, since both B1,B2
and A1,A2 are the same logical postulates parametrised by the appropriate meaning
of “being negative/non-negative”, the only axiom truly separating classical prob-
ability theory from the quantum one is B0 (with the specific form of Σ≥), thus
implementing the requirement of computational efficiency.
4.2.1 Duality
Recall from Section 3.1 that the set {LB ∈L ∗R | LB(g)≥ 0, LB(1R) = 1, ∀g ∈ C }
is the dual of C ⊂LR.
The monomials ⊗mj=1x j form a basis of the space LR. Define the Hermitian
matrix of scalars
Z := LB
(
(⊗mj=1x j)(⊗mj=1x j)†
)
, (21)
and let {zi j} ∈ Cd , with d = n(n+1)2 and n = ∏mj=1 n j, be the vector of variables
obtained by taking the elements of the upper triangular part of Z. Given any gamble
g, we can therefore rewrite LB(g) as a function of the vector {zi j} ∈Cd . This means
that the dual spaceL ∗R is isomorphic toCd , and we can thence define the dual maps
(·)◦ betweenLR and Cd as follows.
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Definition 4. Let C be a closed convex cone inLR. Its dual cone is defined as
C ◦ =
{
z ∈ Cd : LB(g)≥ 0, ∀g ∈ C
}
, (22)
where LB(g) is completely determined by {zi j} via the definition (21).
Example 4. Consider the case n = m = 2, then
LB
(
(⊗2j=1x j)(⊗2j=1x j)†
)
= LB

 x11x
†
11x21x
†
21 x
†
11x12x21x
†
21 x11x
†
11x
†
21x22 x
†
11x12x
†
21x22
x11x
†
12x21x
†
21 x12x
†
12x21x
†
21 x11x
†
12x
†
21x22 x12x
†
12x
†
21x22
x11x
†
11x21x
†
22 x
†
11x12x21x
†
22 x11x
†
11x22x
†
22 x
†
11x12x22x
†
22
x11x
†
12x21x
†
22 x12x
†
12x21x
†
22 x11x
†
12x22x
†
22 x12x
†
12x22x
†
22

 ,
(23)
and so
Z =

z11 z12 z13 z14
z†12 z22 z23 z24
z†13 z
†
23 z33 z34
z†14 z
†
24 z
†
34 z44
 , (24)
with z11 = LB(x11x
†
11x21x
†
21), z12 = LB(x
†
11x12x21x
†
21) etc..
In discussing properties of the dual space, we need the following well-known
result from linear algebra:
Lemma 1. For any M ∈ Hd×d and v ∈ Cd , it holds that
Tr(M(vv†)) = Tr((vv†)M) = v†Mv. (25)
By Lemma 1 and the definitions of g and Z, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 4. Let g(x1, . . . ,xm) = (⊗mj=1x j)†G(⊗mj=1x j) and G Hermitian. Then
for every z ∈ Cd , it holds that LB(g) = Tr(GZ), where Z is defined in (21).
The next lemma states that the only symmetry in the matrix (⊗mj=1x j)(⊗mj=1x j)†
with x j ∈ Cn j is that of being self-adjoint.
Lemma 2. Consider the matrix
X = (⊗mj=1x j)(⊗mj=1x j)†. (26)
Let Xst denote the st-th element of X then for all t ≥ s (upper triangular elements)
we have that Xst = Xkl ∀x j ∈Cn j iff k = s and l = t.
We then verify that
21
Proposition 5. Let C be a P-coherent set of desirable gambles. The following
holds:
C ◦ =
{
z ∈ Cd : LB(g) = Tr(GZ)≥ 0, Z ≥ 0, ∀g ∈ C
}
. (27)
Proof. By P-coherence, C includes Σ≥, which is isomorphic to the closed convex
cone of PSD matrices. We have that
LB(g) = Tr(GZ)≥ 0 ∀g ∈ Σ≥ ⊆ C .
From a standard result in linear algebra, see for instance [46, Lemma 1.6.3], this
implies that Z ≥ 0, i.e., it must be a PSD matrix.
In what follows, we verify that, analogously to Section 3.1, the dual C ◦ is
completely characterised by a closed convex set of states. But before doing that,
we have to clarify what is a state in this context.
In a P-coherent theory, postulate A0 is replaced with postulate B0. Hence, to
define what a state is, one cannot anymore refer to nonnegative gambles but to
gambles that are P-nonnegative. This means that states are linear operators that
assign nonnegative real numbers to P-nonnegative, and that additionally preserve
the unit gamble. In the context of Hermitian gambles, the unitary gamble is
1R(x1, . . . ,xm) = (⊗mj=1x j)†I(⊗mj=1x j) =
m
∏
i=1
x j†x j = 1, (28)
where I is the identity matrix. Therefore, we want that
LB
(
(⊗mj=1x j)†I(⊗mj=1x j)
)
= LB
(
Tr
(
I (⊗mj=1x j)(⊗mj=1x j)†
))
= Tr
(
I LB
(
(⊗mj=1x j)(⊗mj=1x j)†)
))
= Tr(I Z) = Tr(Z) = 1.
(29)
Hence, the set of states is
SB = {z ∈ Cd :| Z ≥ 0, Tr(Z) = 1}. (30)
By reasoning exactly as for Theorem 1, we then have the following result.
Theorem 3. The map
C 7→Q := C ◦∩SB
is a bijection between P-coherent set of desirable gambles inLR and closed convex
subsets of SB.
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Hence, we can identify the dual of a P-coherent set of desirable gambles C ,
with the closed convex set of states
Q = {z ∈ SB : LB(g) = Tr(GZ)≥ 0, ∀g ∈ C } , (31)
which is equivalent to .
Notice that the matrices corresponding to states are density matrices, in fact
(31) is equivalent to {ρ ∈H n×n : ρ ≥ 0,Tr(ρ) = 1,Tr(Gρ)≥ 0, ∀G ∈ C }. Hence,
from now we can identify the set SB with the set of density matrices and denote its
elements as usual with the symbol ρ .
4.2.2 Inference in QT
In this subsection, we use the results of Section 3.2 to derive lower and upper
previsions of a gamble f (x1, . . . ,xm) = (⊗mj=1x j)†F(⊗mj=1x j) in QT. By (17), we
have that
EB( f ) := sup
γ0∈R,λi∈R+
γ0
s.t :
(⊗mj=1x j)†F(⊗mj=1x j)− γ01R(x1, . . . ,xm)−
|G |
∑
i=1
λi(⊗mj=1x j)†Gi(⊗mj=1x j) ∈ Σ≥,
(32)
the upper prevision EB( f ) =−EB(− f ). Note that the membership problem in (32)
reduces to find γ0 ∈ R,λi ∈ R+ such that F − γ0I−
|G |
∑
i=1
Gi is PSD. The dual of the
above optimisation problem is
EB( f ) := infρ∈SB
Tr(Fρ)
s.t :
Tr(Giρ)≥ 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , |G |
(33)
Whenever a P-coherent C is maxima, its dual Q includes a single density matrix
ρ˜11.
EB( f ) = EB( f ) = Tr(F ρ˜).
Hence, in this case both the lower and upper prevision of the gamble f (x1, . . . ,xm)=
(⊗mj=1x j)†F(⊗mj=1x j) coincide with Tr(F ρ˜). Note that in QT the expectation of f
11This does not require |G |= ∞. Since ρ˜ is a matrix it can be uniquely specified by finite assess-
ments of desirability ρ˜ = {ρ : Tr(Giρ)≥ 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , |G |}.
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is Tr(Fρ). This follows by Born’s rule, a law giving the probability that a measure-
ment on a quantum system will yield a given result. The agreement with Born’s
rule is an important constraint in any alternative axiomatisation of QT. Our theory
agrees with it although this is a derived notion in our setting. In fact, in the view of
a density matrix as a dual operator, ρ is formally equal to
ρ = L
(
(⊗mj=1x j)(⊗mj=1x j)†
)
. (34)
Hence, when a projection-valued measurement characterised by the projectorsΠ1, . . . ,Πn
is considered, then
L((⊗mj=1x j)†Πi(⊗mj=1x j)) = Tr(ΠiL((⊗mj=1x j)(⊗mj=1x j)†)) = Tr(Πiρ).
Since Πi ≥ 0 and the polynomials (⊗mj=1x j)†Πi(⊗mj=1x j) for i = 1, . . . ,n form a
partition of unity, i.e.:
n
∑
i=1
(⊗mj=1x j)†Πi(⊗mj=1x j) = (⊗mj=1x j)†I(⊗mj=1x j) = 1,
we have that
Tr(Πiρ) ∈ [0,1] and
n
∑
i=1
Tr(Πiρ) = 1.
For this reason, Tr(Πiρ) is usually interpreted as a probability. But the projectors
Πi’s are not indicator functions, whence, strictly speaking, the traditional interpre-
tation is incorrect. This can be seen clearly in the special case where postulates A0
and B0 coincide, as in the case of a single particle, that is, where the theory can
be given a classical probabilistic interpretation, see next section. In such a case,
the corresponding ρ is just a (truncated) moment matrix, i.e., one for which there
is at least one probability such that E[(⊗mj=1x j)(⊗mj=1x j)†] = ρ . In summary, our
standpoint here is that Tr(Πiρ) should rather be interpreted as the expectation of
the m-quadratic form (⊗mj=1x j)†Πi(⊗mj=1x j). This makes quite a difference with
the traditional interpretation since in our case there can be (and usually there will
be) more than one charge compatible with such an expectation, as we will point
out more precisely, in next section.
4.3 Truncated moment matrices vs. density matrices
In a single particle system of dimension n, ρ = LB(xx†). In this case, ρ can be
interpreted as a truncated moment matrix, i.e., there exists a probability distribution
on the complex vector variable x ∈Ω such that
ρ =
∫
x∈Ω
xx†dµ(x). (35)
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In fact, consider the eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition of the density matrix:
ρ =
n
∑
i=1
λiviv†i ,
with λi ≥ 0 and vi ∈Cn being orthonormal. We can define the probability distribu-
tion
µ(x) =
n
∑
i=1
λiδvi(x),
where δvi is an atomic charge (Dirac’s delta) on vi. Then it is immediate to verify
that ∫
x∈Ω
xx†dµ(x) =
n
∑
i=1
λiviv†i = ρ.
Note also that, a truncated moment matrix does not uniquely define a probability
distribution, i.e., for a given ρ there may exist two probability distributions µ1(x) 6=
µ2(x) such that
ρ =
∫
x∈Ω
xx†dµ1(x) =
∫
x∈Ω
xx†dµ2(x).
This means that if we interpret ρ as a truncated moment matrix, QT is a theory
of imprecise probability [36], that is a density matrix defines a closed convex set
of probability distributions via (35). For m > 1 particles, ρ can be interpreted
as a truncated moment matrix only when the P-coherent set of desirable gambles
associated to ρ , i.e., C = {(⊗mj=1x j)†G(⊗mj=1x j) : Tr(Gρ) ≥ 0}, does not satisfy
the first condition of Theorem 2. We will discuss more on that in the next sections.
5 Explaining the weird
5.1 Entanglement
Entanglement is usually presented as a characteristic of QT. In this section we
are going to show that it is actually an immediate consequence of computational
tractability, meaning that entanglement phenomena are not confined to QT but can
be observed in other contexts too. An example of a non-QT entanglement is pro-
vided in Section 6.
To illustrate the emergence of entanglement from P-coherence, we verify that
the set of desirable gambles whose dual is an entangled density matrix ρe includes
a negative gamble that is not in Σ<, and thus, although being logically coherent, it
cannot be given a classical probabilistic interpretation.
In what follows we focus only on bipartite systems ΩA×ΩB, with n = m = 2.
The results are nevertheless general.
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Let (x,y) ∈ΩA×ΩB, where x = [x1,x2]T and y = [y1,y2]T . We aim at showing
that there exists a gamble h(x,y) = (x⊗ y)†H(x⊗ y) satisfying:
Tr(Hρe)≥ 0 and
h(x,y) = (x⊗ y)†H(x⊗ y)< 0 for all (x,y) ∈ΩA×ΩB.
(36)
The first inequality says that h is desirable in T ?. That is, h is a gamble desirable
to Alice whose beliefs are represented by ρe. The second inequality says that h
is negative and, therefore, leads to a sure loss in T . By B0–B2, the inequalities
in (36) imply that H must be an indefinite Hermitian matrix.
Assume that n = m = 2 and consider the entangled density matrix:
ρe =
1
2

1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1
 ,
and the Hermitian matrix:
H =

0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
0.0 −2.0 1.0 0.0
0.0 1.0 −2.0 0.0
1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
 .
This matrix is indefinite (its eigenvalues are {1,−1,−1,−3}) and is such that
Tr(Hρe) = 1. Since Tr(Hρe)≥ 0, the gamble
(x⊗ y)†H(x⊗ y) =−2x1x†1y2y†2+ x1x†2y1y†2+ x1x†2y†1y2+ x†1x2y1y†2+ x†1x2y†1y2−2x2x†2y1y†1,
(37)
is desirable for Alice in T ?.
Let xi = xia+ ιxib and yi = yia+ ιyib with xia,xib,yia,yib ∈R, for i= 1,2, denote
the real and imaginary components of x,y. Then
(x⊗ y)†H(x⊗ y) =−2x21ay22a−2x21ay22b+4x1ax2ay1ay2a+4x1ax2ay1by2b
−2x21by22a−2x21by22b+4x1bx2by1ay2a+4x1bx2by1by2b
−2x22ay21a−2x22ay21b−2x22by21a−2x22by21b
=− (
√
2x1ay2a−
√
2x2ay1a)2− (
√
2x1ay2b−
√
2x2ay1b)2
− (
√
2x1by2b−
√
2x2by1b)2− (
√
2x2by1a−
√
2x2ay1b)2 < 0.
(38)
This is the essence of the quantum puzzle: C is P-coherent but (Theorem 2)
there is no P associated to it and therefore, from the point of view of a classi-
cal probabilistic interpretation, it is not coherent (in any classical description of
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the composite quantum system, the variables x,y appear to be entangled in a way
unusual for classical subsystems).
As previously mentioned, there are two possible ways out from this impasse:
to claim the existence of either non-classical evaluation functionals or of negative
probabilities. Let us examine them in turn.
(1) Existence of non-classical evaluation functionals: From an informal betting
perspective, the effect of a quantum experiment on h(x,y) is to evaluate this
polynomial to return the payoff for Alice. By Theorem 2, there is no com-
patible classical evaluation functional, and thus in particular no value of the
variables x,y ∈ΩA×ΩB, such that h(x,y) = 1. Hence, if we adopt this point
of view, we have to find another, non-classical, explanation for h(x,y) = 1.
The following evaluation functional, denoted as ev(·), may do the job:
ev


x1y1
x2y1
x1y2
x2y2

=

√
2
2
0
0√
2
2
 , which implies ev((x⊗ y)†H(x⊗ y))= 1.
Note that, x1y1 =
√
2
2 and x2y1 = 0 together imply that x2 = 0, which con-
tradicts x2y2 =
√
2
2 .
12 Similarly, x2y2 =
√
2
2 and x1y2 = 0 together imply that
x1 = 0, which contradicts x1y1 =
√
2
2 . Hence, as expected, the above eval-
uation functional is non-classical. It amounts to assigning a value to the
products xiy j but not to the single components of x and y separately. Quot-
ing [46, Supplement 3.4], “entangled states are holistic entities in which the
single components only exist virtually”.
(2) Existence of negative probabilities: Negative probabilities are not an intrin-
sic characteristic of QT. They appear whenever one attempts to explain QT
“classically” by looking at the space of charges on Ω. To see this, consider
ρe, and assume that, based on (39), one calculates:
∫ 
x1x
†
1y1y
†
1 x
†
1x2y1y
†
1 x1x
†
1y
†
1y2 x
†
1x2y
†
1y2
x1x
†
2y1y
†
1 x2x
†
2y1y
†
1 x1x
†
2y
†
1y2 x2x
†
2y
†
1y2
x1x
†
1y1y
†
2 x
†
1x2y1y
†
2 x1x
†
1y2y
†
2 x
†
1x2y2y
†
2
x1x
†
2y1y
†
2 x2x
†
2y1y
†
2 x1x
†
2y2y
†
2 x2x
†
2y2y
†
2
dµ(x,y)= 12

1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1
 .
(39)
12If the product of two complex numbers x2y1 is zero then either x2 = 0 or y1 = 0.
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Because of Theorem 2, there is no probability charge µ satisfying these mo-
ment constraints, the only compatible being signed ones. Box 1 reports the
nine components and corresponding weights of one of them:
µ(x,y) =
9
∑
i=1
wiδ{(x(i),y(i))}(x,y) with (wi,x
(i),y(i)) as in Box 1. (40)
Note that some of the weights are negative but ∑9i=1 wi = 1, meaning that we
have an affine combination of atomic charges (Dirac’s deltas).
28
Box 1: charge compatible with (39)
1 2 3 4 5
x -0.0963 - 0.6352ι 0.251 - 0.9665ι 0.7884 + 0.2274ι 0.5702 - 0.4006ι 0.3452 - 0.4539ι-0.0065 - 0.7663ι 0.0387 + 0.0381ι -0.1263 + 0.5574ι 0.0027 + 0.7172ι 0.4872 + 0.6613ι
y -0.3727 - 0.3899ι 0.6359 - 0.5716ι 0.1553 - 0.4591ι -0.3515 + 0.2848ι 0.2129 - 0.2004ι-0.4385 - 0.7189ι 0.3725 + 0.3608ι 0.4039 + 0.7759ι 0.5911 - 0.6678ι 0.2032 - 0.9345ι
w 0.4805 0.7459 -0.892 0.7421 0.4724
6 7 8 9
x 0.818 + 0.2654ι -0.0541 - 0.8574ι -0.3179 - 0.1021ι -0.1255 - 0.3078ι-0.486 + 0.1556ι 0.4995 + 0.1112ι 0.5198 + 0.7864ι 0.2943 - 0.8961ι
y 0.446 + 0.6996ι -0.1628 + 0.561ι 0.6285 - 0.4852ι 0.0933 - 0.4588ι-0.5474 - 0.1096ι -0.8105 + 0.0419ι -0.0035 - 0.6079ι 0.8455 + 0.2568ι
w 0.3297 -0.7999 -0.2544 0.1755
The table reports the components of a charge ∑9i=1 wiδ{(x(i),y(i))}(x,y) that satisfies (39).
The i-th column of the row denoted as x (resp. y) corresponds to the element x(i) (resp.
y(i)). The i-th column of the vector w corresponds to wi. Consider for instance the first
monomial x1x
†
1y1y
†
1 in (39), its expectation w.r.t. the above charge is∫
x1x
†
1y1y
†
1
(
9
∑
i=1
wiδ{(x(i),y(i))}(x,y)
)
dxdy =
9
∑
i=1
wix
(i)
1 x
(i)
1
†
y(i)1 y
(i)
1
†
= 0.4805(−0.0963−0.6352ι)(−0.0963+0.6352ι)(−0.3727−0.3899ι)(−0.3727+0.3899ι)
+0.7459(0.251−0.9665ι)(0.251+0.9665ι)(−0.1628+0.561ι)(−0.1628−0.561ι)
+ . . .
+0.1755(−0.1255−0.3078ι)(−0.1255+0.3078ι)(0.0933−0.4588ι)(0.0933+0.4588ι) = 1
2
.
The charge described in Box 1 is one among the many that satisfy (39)
and has been derived numerically. Explicit procedure for constructing such
charge representations have been developed by [50]. An optimisation pro-
cedure to find the representation with the minimum amount of negativity is
given in [51].
Again, we want to stress that the two above paradoxical interpretations are a
consequence of Theorem 2, and therefore can emerge when considering any in-
stance of a theory of P-coherence in which the hypotheses of this result hold.
5.2 Local realism
The issue of local realism in QT arises when one performs measurements on a
pair of separated but entangled particles. This again shows the impossibility of a
peaceful agreement between the internal logical consistency of a P-coherent theory
and the attempt to provide an external coherent (classical) interpretation. Let us
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discuss it from the latter perspective. Firstly, notice that, since (x1x
†
1 + x2x
†
2) = 1,
the linear operator
L


x1x
†
1y1y
†
1 x
†
1x2y1y
†
1 x1x
†
1y
†
1y2 x
†
1x2y
†
1y2
x1x
†
2y1y
†
1 x2x
†
2y1y
†
1 x1x
†
2y
†
1y2 x2x
†
2y
†
1y2
x1x
†
1y1y
†
2 x
†
1x2y1y
†
2 x1x
†
1y2y
†
2 x
†
1x2y2y
†
2
x1x
†
2y1y
†
2 x2x
†
2y1y
†
2 x1x
†
2y2y
†
2 x2x
†
2y2y
†
2

 (41)
satisfies the properties:
L(x1x
†
1y1y
†
1)+L(x2x
†
2y1y
†
1) = L((x1x
†
1+ x2x
†
2)y1y
†
1) = Ly(y1y
†
1),
L(x1x
†
1y2y
†
2)+L(x2x
†
2y2y
†
2) = L((x1x
†
1+ x2x
†
2)y2y
†
2) = Ly(y2y
†
2),
L(x1x
†
1y1y
†
2)+L(x2x
†
2y1y
†
2) = L((x1x
†
1+ x2x
†
2)y1y
†
2) = Ly(y1y
†
2). (42)
Hence, by summing up some of the components of the matrix (41), we can recover
the marginal linear operator
My = Ly
([
y1y
†
1 y1y
†
2
y2y
†
1 y2y
†
2
])
=
[1
2 0
0 12
]
,
where the last equality holds when L((x⊗ y)(x⊗ y)†) = ρe, i.e., My = 12 I2 is the
reduced density matrix of ρe on system B. The operation we have just described,
when applied to a density matrix, is known in QT as partial trace. Given the
interpretation of ρ as a dual operator, the operation of partial trace simply follows
by Equation (42).
Similarly, by partial trace we can obtain
Mx = Lx
([
x1x
†
1 x1x
†
2
x2x
†
1 x2x
†
2
])
=
[1
2 0
0 12
]
.
Matrix Mx (analogously to My) is compatible with probability: there are marginal
probabilities whose Mx is the moment matrix, an example being
1
2
δ
1
0

(x)+
1
2
δ
0
1

(x).
In other words, we are brought to believe that marginally the physical properties
x,y of the two particles have a meaning, i.e., they can be explained through prob-
abilistic mixtures of classical evaluation functionals. We can now ask Nature, by
means of a real experiment, to decide between our common-sense notions of how
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the world works, and Alice’s one. Experimental verification of this phenomenon
can be obtained by a CHSH-like experiment, which aims at experimentally repro-
ducing a situation where (36) holds, as explained in Box 2. In this interpretation,
the CHSH experiment is an entanglement witness, we discuss the connection be-
tween (36) and the entanglement witness theorem in Section 5.3.
Box 2: CHSH experiment
 two-channel polarizers
source
detectors detectors
α
j
β
j
The source produces pairs of entangled photons, sent in opposite directions. Each photon en-
counters a two-channel polariser whose orientations can be set by the experimenter. Emerging
signals from each channel are captured by detectors. Four possible orientations αi,β j for i, j =
1,2 of the polarisers are tested. Consider the Hermitian matrices Gαi = sin(αi)σx + cos(αi)σz,
Gβ j = sin
(
β j
)
σx + cos
(
β j
)
σz, where σx,σz are the 2D Pauli’s matrices, and define the gamble
(x†Gαi x)(y
†Gβ j y) = (x⊗ y)†Gαiβ j (x⊗ y)
on the result of experiment with Gαiβ j = Gαi ⊗Gβ j . Consider then the sum gamble
h(x,y) = (x⊗ y)†(Gα1β2 −Gα1β2 +Gα2β1 +Gα2β2)(x⊗ y)
and observe that
h(x,y) = (x⊗ y)†(Gα1 ⊗ (Gβ2 −Gβ2))(x⊗ y)+(x⊗ y)†(Gα2 ⊗ (Gβ1 +Gβ2))(x⊗ y)
= (x†Gα2 x)(y
†(Gβ1 +Gβ2)y)
≤ y†(Gβ1 +Gβ2)y
≤ 2,
this is the CHSH inequality. For a small ε > 0, we have that
h(x,y)−2− ε = (x⊗ y)†(−(2+ ε)I4 +Gα1β2 −Gα1β2 +Gα2β1 +Gα2β2)(x⊗ y)< 0
but
Tr((−(2+ ε)I4 +Gα1β2 −Gα1β2 +Gα2β1 +Gα2β2)ρe) =−2+ ε+2
√
2≥ 0
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for α1 = pi/2,α2 = 0,β1 = pi/4,β2 = −pi/4. We are again in a situation like (36). The ex-
periment in the figure certifies the entanglement by measuring the QT expectation of the four
components of h(x,y).
The situation we have just described is the playground of Bell’s theorem, stat-
ing the impossibility of Einstein’s principle of local realism: that is, the combina-
tion of the assumption that faraway events cannot influence each other faster than
the speed of light (locality), with the assumption that properties of objects have a
definite, real, value even if they are not measured (realism).
The argument goes as follows. If we assume that the physical properties x,y
of the two particles (the polarization of the photons) have definite values x˜, y˜ that
exist independently of observation, then the measurement on the first qubit must
influence the result of the measurement on the second qubit. Vice versa if we
assume locality, then x,y cannot exist independently of the observations. To sum
up, a local hidden variable theory that is compatible with QT results cannot exist
[52].
But is there really anything contradictory here? The message we want to con-
vey is that this is not the case. Indeed, since Theorem 2 applies, ρe is not a moment
matrix of any probability. Ergo, although they may seem to be compatible with
probabilities, the marginal matrices Mx,My are not moment matrices of any proba-
bility. The conceptual mistake in the situation we are considering is to forget that
Mx,My come from ρe. A joint linear operator uniquely defines its marginals but
not the other way round. There are infinitely many joint probability charges whose
Mx,My are the marginals, e.g.,
dµ(x,y) =
12δ
1
0

(x)+
1
2
δ
0
1

(x)

12δ
1
0

(y)+
1
2
δ
0
1

(y)
 ,
but none of them satisfy Equation (39). Instead, the reader can verify that the
charge in Equation (40) satisfies both Equation (39) and:
∫ [
x1x
†
1 x1x
†
2
x2x
†
1 x2x
†
2
]
dµ(x,y) =
∫ [
y1y
†
1 y1y
†
2
y2y
†
1 y2y
†
2
]
dµ(x,y) =
[1
2 0
0 12
]
.
The take-away message of this subsection is that we should only interpret
Mx,My as marginal operators and keep in mind that QT is a logical theory of P-
coherence. We see paradoxes when we try to force a physical interpretation upon
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QT, whose nature is instead computational. In other words, if we accept that com-
putation is more primitive than our classical interpretation of physics, all paradoxes
disappear.
5.3 Entanglement witness theorem
In the previous Subsections, we have seen that all paradoxes of QT emerge because
of disagreement between its internal coherence and the attempt to force on it a
classical coherent interpretation.
Do quantum and classical probability sometimes agree? Yes they do, but when
at play there are density matrices ρ such that Equation (36) does not hold, and
thus in particular for separable density matrices. We make this claim precise by
providing a link between Equation (36) and the entanglement witness theorem [53,
54].
We first report the definition of entanglement witness [55, Sec. 6.3.1]:
Definition 5 (Entanglement witness). A Hermitian operator W ∈H n1×n2 is an en-
tanglement witness if and only if W is not a positive operator but (x1⊗x2)†W (x1⊗
x2)≥ 0 for all vectors (x1,x2) ∈Ω1×Ω2.13
The next well-known result (see, e.g., [55, Theorem 6.39, Corollary 6.40])
provides a characterisation of entanglement and separable states in terms of entan-
glement witness.
Proposition 6. A state ρe is entangled if and only if there exists an entanglement
witness W such that Tr(ρeW )< 0. A state is separable if and only if Tr(ρeW )≥ 0
for all entanglement witnesses W.
Assume that W is an entanglement witness for ρe and consider W ′ =−W . By
Definition 5 and Proposition 6, it follows that
Tr(ρeW ′)> 0 and (x1⊗ x2)†W ′(x1⊗ x2)≤ 0. (43)
The first inequality states that the gamble (x1⊗x2)†W ′(x1⊗x2) is strictly desir-
able for Alice (in theoryT ?) given her belief ρe. Since the set of desirable gambles
(B1) associated to ρe is closed, there exists ε > 0 such that W ′′ =W ′− εI is still
desirable, i.e, Tr(ρeW ′′)≥ 0 and
(x1⊗ x2)†W ′′(x1⊗ x2) = (x1⊗ x2)†W ′(x1⊗ x2)− ε < 0,
13In [55, Sec. 6.3.1], the last part of this definition says “for all factorized vectors x1⊗x2”. This is
equivalent to considering the pair (x1,x2).
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where we have exploited that (x1⊗ x2)†εI(x1⊗ x2) = ε . Therefore, (43) is equiva-
lent to
Tr(ρeW ′′)≥ 0 and (x1⊗ x2)†W ′′(x1⊗ x2)< 0, (44)
which is the same as (36).
Hence, by Theorem 2, we can equivalently formulate the entanglement witness
theorem as an arbitrage/Dutch book:
Theorem 4. Let C = {g(x1, . . . ,xm) = (⊗mj=1x j)†G(⊗mj=1x j) | Tr(Gρ˜)≥ 0} be the
set of desirable gambles corresponding to some density matrix ρ˜ . The following
claims are equivalent:
1. ρ˜ is entangled;
2. posi(C ∪L ≥) is not coherent in T .
This result provides another view of the entanglement witness theorem in light
of P-coherence. In particular, it tells us that the existence of a witness satisfying
Equation (43) boils down to the disagreement between the classical probabilistic
interpretation and the theory T ? on the rationality (coherence) of Alice, and there-
fore that whenever they agree on her rationality it means that ρe is separable.
This connection explains why the problem of characterising entanglement is
hard in QT: it amounts to proving the negativity of a function, which is NP-hard.
6 Entangled states do not only exist in QT
In this Section we are going to present an example of entanglement in a P-coherence
theory of probability that is different from QT.
Consider two real variables x = [x1,x2]T with xi ∈R, the possibility space Ω=
{x ∈ R2} and the vector space of gambles
LR = {vT (x)Gv(x) : G is a symmetric real matrix},
where v(x) is the column vector of monomials:
v(x) = [1,x1,x2,x21,x1x2,x
2
2,x
3
1,x
2
1x2,x1x
2
2,x
3
2]
T ,
whose dimension is d = 10. LR is therefore the space of all polynomials of degree
6 of the real variables x1,x2. It can be observed that in LR the constant functions
can be represented as
vT (x)Gv(x) = vT (x)(ce1eT1 )v(x) = c,
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for any constant c ∈ R, e1 being the first element of the canonical basis of Rd , i.e.,
e1 = [1,0, . . . ,0]. Compare this with (28).
We say that C is a P-coherent set of desirable gambles whenever it satisfies
(B0)–(B2) in Section 4.2 with
Σ≥ = {g(x1,x2) = vT (x)Gv(x) : G≥ 0}, (45)
Σ< = {g(x1,x2) = vT (x)Gv(x) : G < 0}. (46)
The polynomial vT (x)Gv(x) with G≥ 0 are called sum-of-square polynomials, see
also Section 7.6.
In this case too we can define the dual operator
Z := LB
(
v(x)vT (x)
)
. (47)
If we define zαβ = L(xα1 x
β
2 ), then Z has the following structure
Z =

z00 z10 z01 z20 z11 z02 z30 z21 z12 z03
z10 z20 z11 z30 z21 z12 z40 z31 z22 z13
z01 z11 z02 z21 z12 z03 z31 z22 z13 z04
z20 z30 z21 z40 z31 z22 z50 z41 z32 z23
z11 z21 z12 z31 z22 z13 z41 z32 z23 z14
z02 z12 z03 z22 z13 z04 z32 z23 z14 z05
z30 z40 z31 z50 z41 z32 z60 z51 z42 z33
z21 z31 z22 z41 z32 z23 z51 z42 z33 z24
z12 z22 z13 z32 z23 z14 z42 z33 z24 z15
z03 z13 z04 z23 z14 z05 z33 z24 z15 z06
 (48)
It is not difficult to verify that, given X = v(x)vT (x), in this case Lemma 2 does not
hold. This is actually the reason why the dual matrix Z has additional symmetries.
Now, the dual of C can be calculated as in Section 4.2.1:
Q =
{
z ∈ Rd : LB(g) = Tr(GZ)≥ 0, Z ≥ 0, z00 = 1, ∀g ∈ C
}
. (49)
Note that, because the way constants are represented in this context, we have z00 =
1 instead of Tr(Z) = 1.
Since sum-of-squares implies nonnegativity, a natural question is to known
whether any nonnegative polynomial of degree 6 of the real variables x1,x2 can
be expressed as a sum of squares. It turns out that this is not the case. Indeed,
David Hilbert showed that equality between the set of nonnegative polynomials of
n variables of degree 2d and sos polynomials of n variables of degree 2d holds
only in the following three cases: univariate polynomials (i.e., n = 1); quadratic
polynomials (2d = 2); bivariate quartics (n = 2, 2d = 4). For all other cases, there
always exist nonnegative polynomials that are not sums of squares. The most fa-
mous counter-example is a polynomial due to Motzkin:
m(x) = x41x
2
2+ x
2
1x
4
2− x21x22+1.
35
Motzkin polynomial is nonnegative but it is not a sum-of-squares. In what
follow, it will be used to prove that a theory T ∗ in the space of polynomials of two
real variables of degree 6 has “entangled density matrices” in its dual space.
Consider the following PSD matrix [56] of type (48)
Ze =

1 0 0 353 0 353 0 0 0 0
0 353 0 0 0 0 249572 0 66 0
0 0 353 0 0 0 0 66 0 249572
353 0 0 249572 0 66 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 66 0 0 0 0 0
353 0 0 66 0 249572 0 0 0 0
0 249572 0 0 0 0 706955894 0 17 0
0 0 66 0 0 0 0 17 0 17
0 66 0 0 0 0 17 0 17 0
0 0 249572 0 0 0 0 17 0 706955894
 (50)
and the negative polynomial −m(x). Since L( f ) = −1− z42− z24 + z22 and z22 =
66,z24 = z42 = 17 in (50), we have that L( f ) = 31 > 0. Therefore, the conditions
in (36) are met and Theorem 2 holds. In particular, this means that the polynomial
−m(x) is desirable by a subject, Alice, whose beliefs are expressed by Ze and who
is therefore a rational agent in T ∗. However, the polynomial is negative: Alice is
irrational in T .
Notice that, if we consider the definition of entanglement in Section 5.3, Ze
is an entanglement matrix. Moreover, from (50) and the definition of Z we can
extract the marginal operator for the variables x1,x2.
Mx1 = L
 1 x1 x21 x31x1 x21 x31 x41
x21 x
3
1 x
4
1 x
5
1
x31 x
4
1 x
5
1 x
6
1
= [ 1 0 353 00 353 0 249572353 0 249572 0
0 249572 0 706955894
]
, (51)
Mx2 = L
 1 x2 x22 x32x2 x22 x32 x42
x22 x
3
2 x
4
2 x
5
2
x32 x
4
2 x
5
2 x
6
2
= [ 1 0 353 00 353 0 249572353 0 249572
0
0 249572 0 706955894
]
. (52)
This time the operation is not equal to partial trace because, again, the structure of
the polynomials vT (x)Gv(x) is different from those in QT.
Since Mx1 ,Mx2 are both PSD they are valid moment matrices. Moreover, for
single real variables, Hilbert as shown that every nonnegative polynomial is SOS
and, therefore, marginally, the above truncated moment matrices are compatible
with classical probability. A subject whose marginal beliefs are expressed by
Mx1 ≥ 0,Mx2 ≥ 0 is always rational inT . This is exactly the same situation encoun-
tered when showing the impossibility of a local realistic interpretation of quantum
mechanics (see Section 5.2): the marginals seem compatible with classical prob-
ability but the joint is not, since we can derive a Bell-type inequalities that are
violated by Ze.
Again the conceptual mistake of this reading is to forget that Mx and My come
from Ze and thus they should only be interpreted as marginal operators .
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7 Discussions
7.1 First postulate of QT from polynomial time complexity
The first postulate of QT is formulated as follows:
Associated to any isolated physical system is a complex vector space
with inner product (that is, a Hilbert space) known as the state space
of the system. The system is completely described by its density oper-
ator, which is a positive operator ρ with trace one, acting on the state
space of the system.
This postulate is usually explained by noticing that the density matrix ρ is the
quantum-mechanical analogue to a phase-space probability measure in classical
statistical mechanics. One of the fundamental questions in QT is why quantum
experiments cannot be described via a classical phase-space probability measure.
In this paper, we argued that a possible explanation may be found in the compu-
tational resources necessary to address consistency (rationality) in classical prob-
ability. Addressing rationality in the classical case reduces to prove that a real-
valued bounded function is nonnegative. However, the problem of verifying the
nonnegativity of a function is undecidable or, when decidable, is in general NP-
hard.
If the universe is “inherently” probabilistic and if QT is the theory of physics
that describes such probabilistic nature, QT should be first a computable theory of
probability and, moreover, computationally efficient. A way to define a compu-
tationally efficient theory of probability is (i) to restrict the space of functions of
interest (observables); (2) to redefine the meaning of nonnegative/negative. From
the point of view of a logical theory, these two points mean, firstly to set the appro-
priate language (the syntax of the theory), and secondly, to define which formulas
are the tautologies and which are the contradictions, the remaining apparatus of the
theory being structurally the same as before.
The key postulate that separates classical probability and QT is B0: the com-
putation postulate. Because of B0, Theorem 2 applies and thus the “weirdness” of
QT follows: negative probabilities, existence of non-classical evaluation function-
als and, therefore, irreconcilability with the classical probabilistic view.
The formulation of Theorem 2 points to the fact that there are three equivalent
ways to provide a theoretical foundation of QT.
The first way is the one adopted within the Quantum Logic (QL) approach.
QL justifies the differences between QT and classical probability with the premise
that, in QT, the Boolean algebra of events is taken over by the “quantum logic” of
projection operators on a Hilbert space. This gives raise to a new theory of proba-
bility. The QL probabilistic formalism was developed by [1] and then formalised
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by Mackey’s eight axioms [3]. The key axiom (Axiom VII) defines the algebra of
the events and can be seen as a formalisation of the properties of what we have
called “non classical evaluation functions”. We want point out that “non classical
evaluation functions” only exist when looking from the outside of the theory as a
way to justify how a negative polynomial can assume positive values in a quantum
experiment.
The second way is the so called quasi-probability (QP) formulations of QT.
It is based on the view that the quantum-classical contrast in QT is due to the
appearance of negativity. In QP, the possibility space (and the events) is classical
but probability distributions are replaced by quasi-probability distributions.
One of the critical issues with negative probabilities is their interpretation. This
is clearly stated in [57]
The main difficulty with interpreting negativity in a particular quasi-
probability representation as a criterion for or definition of quantum-
ness is the non-uniqueness of that particular quasi-probability repre-
sentation. We can always find a new representation in which any given
state admits a non-negative quasi-probability representation. Recall,
in fact, that in some representations all states are non-negative. Thus,
negativity of some state ρ in one particular arbitrary representation is
a meaningless notion of quantumness per se.
We agree that quasi-probability distributions are a meaningless notion per se.14 In
our view, their only justification is thorough a notion of coherence (logical consis-
tency), as done with an abstract notion of classical probability theory.
Why is the charge in Box 1 a valid quasi-probability representation? The rea-
son is that it corresponds to the dual of a maximal P-coherent set of desirable
gambles C . A subject (Alice) that uses that charge to make rational choices on
the results of a quantum experiment cannot be made a sure loser in the theory T ∗.
The fact that charges are not unique is neither surprising nor a characteristic of
QT. In classical probability, it is well known that any truncated moment matrix
defines a closed convex set of probability distributions. Similarly, one can check
that any “quasi-moment” matrix ρ defines a closed affine set of quasi-probability
distributions. Such intrinsic non-uniqueness is another amazing characteristic of
QT: from the perspective of a probabilistic interpretation, QT is not only a theory
of probability, but a theory of imprecise probability.
The third way, championed in this paper, argues that the quantum-classical
contrast has a purely computational character. It starts by accepting the so-called
14Notice that in the theory T ∗, quasi-probability distributions do not exist, the dual space being
{ρ : ρ ≥ 0, Tr(ρ) = 1}.
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Exponential Time Hypothesis (P6=NP) to justify the separation between the mi-
croscopic quantum system and the macroscopic world. We quote Scott Aaronson
[58]
can NP-complete problems be solved in polynomial time using the re-
sources of the physical universe? I will argue that studying this ques-
tion can yield new insights, not just about computer science but about
physics as well. More controversially, I will also argue that a nega-
tive answer might eventually attain the same status as (say) the Sec-
ond Law of Thermodynamics, or the impossibility of superluminal
signalling. In other words, while experiment will always be the last
appeal, the presumed intractability of NP-complete problems might
be taken as a useful constraint in the search for new physical theories.
B0 may indeed be the fundamental law in QT, similarly to the Second Law of Ther-
modynamics, or the impossibility of superluminal signalling. To the best knowl-
edge of the authors, the present work is the first that explains QT in terms of com-
putational complexity.
7.2 The class of P-nonnegative gambles
The class of P-nonnegative gambles, defined in Section 4.2, is the closed con-
vex cone of all Hermitian sum-of-squares in LR = {(⊗mj=1x j)†G(⊗mj=1x j) | G ∈
H r×r}, that is of all gambles g(x1, . . . ,xm) ∈LR for which G is PSD. In particular
this means that Alice can efficiently determine whether a gamble is P-nonnegative
or not. But is this class the only closed convex cone of nonnegative polynomials in
LR for which the membership problem can be solved efficiently (in polynomial-
time)? It turns out that the answer is negative (see for instance [49, 59]): in ad-
dition of Hermitian sum-of-squares (the one that Nature has chosen for QT) one
could also consider real sum-of-squares in LR, that is polynomials of the form
(⊗mj=1x j)†G(⊗mj=1x j) that are sum-of-squares of polynomials of the real and imag-
inary part of the variables x j.
A separating example is the polynomial in (37), which is not a Hermitian sum-
of-squares but it is a real sum-of-square, as it can be seen from (38). This polyno-
mial was used in our example because it can be constructed by inspection and its
nonnegativity follows immediately by (38). Clearly, there exist nonnegative poly-
nomials inLR that are neither Hermitian sum-of-squares nor real sum-of-squares.
Why has Nature chosen Hermitian sum-of-squares? This is an open question
that we will investigate in future work. A possible explanation may reside in the
different size of the corresponding optimisation problems [59].
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7.3 A hidden variable model for a single quantum system
In [60], Kochen and Specker gave a hidden variable model agreeing with the Born’s
rule but not preserving the structure of functional dependencies in QT. Their idea
amounted to introducing a “hidden variable” for each observable H producing
stochasticity in outcomes of measurement of H. The totality of all such hidden
variables is then the phase space variable ω of the model.
It turns out that, for a single quantum system, our model based on the phase
space
Ω= {x ∈ Cn : x†x = 1},
is also a hidden variable model. The reason being that, for a single quantum sys-
tem, Σ≥ = L ≥R and Σ
< = L <R , and therefore Alice will never accepts negative
gambles. Notice that in this case, the matrix ρ = L(xx†) can be interpreted as a
moment matrix as discussed in Section 4.3. This hidden-variable model for QT is
also discussed in [46, Sec. 1.7], where the author explains why this model does not
contradict the existing “no-go” theorems for hidden-variables. Our hidden vari-
able model differs from Holevo’s one when we consider m > 1 particles. This is
discussed in the next section.
7.4 On the use of tensor product
We have seen in Section 4.1 that the possibility space of composite systems of m
particles, each one with n j degrees of freedom, is given by Ω=∏mj=1C
n j , and that
gambles (real-valued observable) on such space are actually bounded real functions
g(x1, . . . ,xm) = (⊗mj=1x j)†G(⊗mj=1x j), where⊗ denotes the tensor product between
vectors, seen as column matrices.
In what follows, we justify the use of tensor product, and more specifically the
type of gambles on the possibility space of composite systems, as a consequence
of the way a multivariate theory of probability is usually formulated.
As a start, let us consider the case of classical probability. There, structural
judgements of independence/dependence between random variables are expressed
thorough product between random variables. Indeed, given factorised gambles
g(x1, . . . ,xm) = ∏mj=1 g j(x j), the variables x1, . . . ,xm are said to be independent if
E[∏mj=1 g j(x j)] =∏
m
j=1 E[g j(x j)] for all g j, where E[·] denote the expectation op-
erator.
With this in mind, let us go back to our setting. Marginal gambles are of
type g j(x j) = x
†
jG jx j. This means that structural judgements are performed by
considering factorised gambles of the form ∏mj=1 x
†
jG jx j. As mention in Section
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4.1, it is thence not difficult to verify that
m
∏
j=1
x†jG jx j = (⊗mj=1x j)†(⊗mj=1G j)(⊗mj=1x j).
By closing the set of factorised gambles under the operations of addition and scalar
(real number) multiplication, one finally gets a vector space whose domain do-
main coincides with the collection of all gambles of the form (⊗mj=1x j)†G(⊗mj=1x j).
Hence, structural judgements of independence/dependence are stated by Alice con-
sidering the desirability of gambles belonging toLR.
In QT, there is a confusion over the role of the tensor product used to define
the state space. This confusion is a consequence of Theorem 2. By duality, we
can prove that, given two quantum systems A and B, with corresponding Hilbert
spacesHA andHB, the density matrix (state) of the joint system lives in the tensor
product spaceHA⊗HB. This follows by:
L((⊗2j=1x j)†G(⊗2j=1x j)) = L(Tr(G(⊗2j=1x j)(⊗2j=1x j)†))
= Tr(G L((⊗2j=1x j)(⊗2j=1x j)†)).
and L((⊗2j=1x j)(⊗2j=1x j)†) belongs toHA⊗HB.
However, when (36) holds, we may justify entanglement hypothesising the
existence of non classical evaluation functions or, equivalently, a larger possibility
space (Theorem 2). This is clearly discussed in [46, Supplement 3.4]:
Since the set of pure states of the composite system Ω is larger than
Cartesian product ΩA×ΩB, the phase space of the classical descrip-
tion of the composite system will be larger than the product of phase
spaces for the components: ΩA×ΩB  Ω. Therefore this classical de-
scription is not a correspondence between the categories of classical
and quantum system preserving the operation of forming the compos-
ite systems. Moreover, it appears that there is no way to establish such
a correspondence. In any classical description of a composite quantum
system the variables corresponding to observables of the components
are necessarily entangled in the way unusual for classical subsystems.
We argue that ΩA×ΩB  Ω is a manifestation of computational rationality.
7.5 Deriving the remaining postulates of QM
Partially inspired by [23], in [25] we introduced a syntactically different framework
from which we were able to derive the postulates of QT. It is roughly defined as
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follows. Assume the space of outcomes of experiment on a n-dimensional quantum
systems is represented by the set Ω = {ω1, . . . ,ωn}, with ωi denoting the elemen-
tary event “detection along i”. A gamble on an experiment is a Hermitian matrix
G ∈H n×n. By accepting a gamble G, Alice commits herself to receive γi ∈ R
utiles if the outcome of the experiment eventually happens to be ωi, where γi is de-
fined from G and the projection-valued measurement Π∗ = {Π∗i }ni=1, representing
the n orthogonal directions of the quantum state, as follows:
Π∗i GΠ
∗
i = γiΠ
∗
i for i = 1, . . . ,n. (53)
A subsetH n×n is thus said to be coherent if it is a closed convex cone C con-
taining the set {G∈H n×n : G 0} of all PSD matrices inH n×n and disjoint from
the interior of {G ∈H n×n : G ≤ 0}. We then proved that the dual of a coherent
convex cone of matrix gambles C is a closed convex set of density matrices [25,
Prop.IV.3]:
Q =
{
ρ ∈H n×n : ρ ≥ 0,Tr(ρ) = 1,Tr(Gρ)≥ 0, ∀G ∈ C} . (54)
When C is a maximal cone, its dualQ := C• includes a single density matrix. This
allowed us to show that QT is a generalised theory of probability: its axiomatic
foundation can be derived from a logical consistency requirement in the way a
subject accepts gambles on the results of a quantum experiment (similar to the
axiomatic foundation of classical probability). However, at the time of writing
[25], it was not clear to us why the probability is generalised in such a way in QT,
what this could possibly mean, why does entanglement exist, etc. That is, it was
not clear to us that everything follows by the computation postulate B0.
Below, by providing a bijection between coherent convex cones of matrices
and P-coherent systems of polynomial gambles, we show the connection between
[25] and the present work. In order to that, we first need to replace [25, Definition
III.1,(S3)], that is the openness property, with (S3’): if G+ εI ∈ C for all ε > 0
then G is in C (closeness). Hence, the bijection f between C and C is obtained by
first noticing the correspondence between the duals (31) and (54), and thus simply
composing the duality maps from C toQ and fromQ to C:
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QC=posi(G∪Σ≥)︷ ︸︸ ︷{|G |
∑
i=1
λi(⊗mj=1x j)†Gi(⊗mj=1x j)+(⊗mj=1x j)†M(⊗mj=1x j) : λi ≥ 0,M ≥ 0
}
{|G |
∑
i=1
λiGi +M : λi ≥ 0,M ≥ 0
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
f
Based on f and the results in [25], it is therefore almost15 immediate to derive
from B0–B2 the remaining other axioms and rules of QT (such as Lu¨der’s rule
(measurement updating), Schro¨dinger’s rule (time evolution)), see Appendix D.
7.6 Sum-of-squares optimisation
The theory of moments (and its dual theory of positive polynomials) are used to
develop efficient numerical schemes for polynomial optimization, i.e., global opti-
mization problems with polynomial function. Such problems arise in the analysis
and control of nonlinear dynamical systems, and also in other areas such as combi-
natorial optimization. This scheme consists of a hierarchy of semidefinite programs
(SDP) of increasing size which define tighter and tighter relaxations of the original
problem. Under some assumptions, it can be showed that the associated sequence
of optimal values converges to the global minimum, see for instance [61, 62]. Note
that, every polynomial in
Σ≥ := {g(x1, . . . ,xm) = (⊗mj=1x j)†G(⊗mj=1x j) : G≥ 0},
is (Hermitian) sum-of-squares because it can be rewritten as:
(⊗mj=1x j)†HH†(⊗mj=1x j) =
k
∑
i=1
|(H†(⊗mj=1x j))i|2,
with G = HH†.
We have recently discussed the connection between SOS optimisation (for
polynomials of real variables) and computational rationality (also called bounded
rationality) in [63].
15We need to take into account that (S3) has been replaced by (S3’).
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In QT, SDP has been used to numerically prove that a certain state is entangled
[64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72]. The work [65, 66] realized that the set of separa-
ble quantum states can be approximated by sum-of-squares hierarchies. This leads
to the SDP hierarchy of Doherty-Parrilo-Spedalieri, which is extensively employed
in quantum information.
The present, purely foundational, work differs from these approaches by stat-
ing that the Universe (microscopic world) is nothing but a big “device” that solves
SOS optimisation problems. In fact, as discussed in Section 7.1, the postulate of
computational efficiency embodied by B0 (through the above definition of Σ≥, i.e.,
the cone of Hermitian sum-of-squares polynomials) may indeed be the fundamen-
tal law in QT. This totally different perspective may have an enormous impact in
quantum computer, such as the development of new algorithms for quantum com-
puting that exploit the connection between QT and SDP highlighted in this paper.
A Technicalities for Subsection 2.3
Recall that the dualK • ofK is given by {µ ∈M : ∫ gdµ ≥ 0, ∀g ∈K }. Simi-
larly, the dual of a subsetR ofM is the set:
R• =
{
g ∈L :
∫
gdµ ≥ 0, ∀µ ∈R
}
. (55)
Note that in both cases (·)• is always a closed convex cone [42, Lem.5.102(4)].
Furthermore, one has that (·)•• = (·), whenever (·) is a closed convex cone [42,
Th.5.103], and (·)1 ⊆ (·)2 if and only if (·)•2 ⊆ (·)•1 [42, Lem.5.102(1)]. In par-
ticular, whenever (·)1 and (·)2 are closed convex cones, (·)1 ( (·)2 if and only if
(·)•2 ( (·)•1.
Based on those facts, it is thus possible to verify that the dual of a coherent
set of desirable gambles can actually be completely described in terms of a (closed
convex) set of states (probability charges). In this aim, we start by the following
observations.
Proposition 7. It holds that
1. (L )• = {0} andL = ({0})•;
2. (L ≥)• =M≥ andL ≥ = (M≥)•;
Proof. Since (·)•• = (·), whenever (·) is a closed convex cone, in both cases it
is enough to verify only one of the claims. For the first item, the second claim
is immediate. For the second item, we verify the first claim. The inclusion from
right to left being clear, for the other direction observe that: (i) g = I{B} (with IB
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being the indicator function on B ∈A ), is a nonnegative gamble and, therefore, is
inL ≥; (ii) if µ is negative in B ∈A , i.e., then ∫ IBdµ is negative too and, thus, µ
cannot be in (L ≥)•.
Proposition 8. LetK be a closed convex cone. The following claims are equiva-
lent
1. K is coherent;
2. K ⊇L ≥ andK 6=L ;
3. (K )• ⊆M≥ and (K )• 6= {0}.
Proof. (2) ⇔ (3): From Proposition 7, (K )• = {0} if and only if K =L , and
K ⊇L ≥ if and only if (K )• ⊆M≥.
(1)⇒ (2): Assume K is coherent. By A.1 K ⊇L ≥ and by A.2 there is g ∈L
such that supg < 0 and g /∈K .
(2)⇒ (1): LetL ≥ ⊆K (L . First of all, notice that, by Proposition 7, (K )• ⊆
(L ≥)• =M≥. Now, assume that K is not coherent. This means A.2 fails, i.e.
there is g ∈L such that supg < 0 and g ∈K . Hence, consider µ ∈M≥ and pick
g∈K such that supg< 0. It holds that 〈g,µ〉≥ 0 if and only if µ = 0, meaning that
(K )• = {0} and therefore, by Proposition 7 again,K =L , a contradiction.
PROOF OF THEOREM 1. We want to verify that the map
K 7→P :=K •∩S
establishes a bijection between coherent sets of desirable gambles and non-empty
closed convex sets of states. The proof is analogous to that by [73, Th.4]. Let
K be a coherent set of desirable gambles. By Proposition 8, we get that K • is
a closed convex cone included in M≥ that does not reduce to the origin. Thus,
after normalisation, P is nonempty. Preservation of closedness and convexity by
finite intersections yields thatP is closed and convex. Furthermore R+P =K •,
and thereforeK = (R+P)•, where R+P := {λµ : λ ≥ 0,µ ∈P}, meaning that
the map is an injection. We finally verify that the map is also a surjection. To
do this, let P be a non empty closed convex set of probability charges. It holds
that R+P is a closed convex cone included in M≥ different from {0}. Again by
Proposition 8, we conclude that the dual (R+P)• of R+P is a coherent set of
desirable gambles andP = R+P ∩S= (R+P)••∩S.
As an immediate corollary of the previous results, we finally obtain Theorem
5. It provides us with a characterisation of the dual of a closed convex cone which
is not coherent.
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Theorem 5. Let K be a non empty closed convex cone. Then the following are
equivalent
1. K 6=L andK is not coherent;
2. K • 6⊆M≥,
3. K •∩{µ ∈M | 〈1,µ〉= 1} 6⊆ S.
4. {0}(K • andK •∩S= /0.
Essentially, Theorem 5 is telling us that, from the dual point of view, non de-
generated closed convex cones of gambles that are not coherent are characterised
by signed (non positive) charges.
PROOF OF THEOREM 5. Given a non empty closed convex coneK , we need to
check that the following claims are equivalent
1. K 6=L andK is not coherent;
2. (K )• 6⊆M≥,
3. K •∩{µ ∈M | 〈1,µ〉= 1} 6⊆ S.
4. {0}(K • andK •∩S= /0.
Notice thatK • ⊇ {0}, and that, by Proposition 7, all claims implyK • 6= {0} and
K 6= L . The equivalence between (2) and (3) being obvious, the one between
(1) and (2) is an immediate consequence of Proposition 8. For the equivalence
between (1) and (4), first of all notice that, sinceK is a non empty closed convex
cone, {0} ⊆K • if and only if K 6=L . Now, assume K is not coherent. This
means there is a negative gamble g in K . Hence, K • ∩S = /0 since probability
charges do not preserves negative gambles. Finally, ifK is coherent, by Theorem
1,K •∩S is a non-empty closed convex cone of probability charges.
B Relative coherence
Why do we needT if it is dual to classical probability theory? The point is that,T ,
having the structure of an abstract logic, is independent of the specific contingent
properties of the underlying space of gambles. From this perspective, it is thence
more general than probability theory and can be used to model any circumstance
in which an agent has to make a rational choice.
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For instance, we can define the desirability postulates on any vector subspace
of L that includes constant gambles. This is useful in applications where the
gambles Alice can examine are a subset ofL .16
In what follows we verify under which circumstances the dual is still the clas-
sical theory of probability. Then, later on we will see that sometimes we can get a
weaker theory of probabilities.
Let LR denote a closed linear subspace of L that includes all constant gam-
bles. By L ≥R =L
≥ ∩LR we denote the subset of nonnegative gambles, and by
L <R =L
<∩LR we denote the subset of negative gambles. We thus relativise pos-
tulates A0–A2 as follows. Firstly, we restrict tautologies, and thus the extension of
the predicate being nonnegative, to the considered subspace.
AR0. L ≥R should always be desirable.
Secondly, we modify the deductive closure accordingly.
AR1. NR(GR) := clposi(L ≥R ∪GR).
Notice that NR(GR)⊆LR, for GR⊆LR. In such case we sometimes denote NR(GR)
byKR.
Hence, finally, we state that:
Definition 6 (Relative coherence postulate). A setKR ⊆LR is coherent relative to
LR if and only if
AR2. L <R ∩KR = /0.
It is easy to check that T and its relativisation to LR defined by Postulates
AR0–AR2, denoted by TR, are fully compatible. That is:
Theorem 6. Let GR be a set of assessments inLR. NR(GR) is coherent in TR if and
only if N(GR) is coherent in T . Moreover NR(GR) =LR∩N(GR).
Finally, we compare inference in theory TR with inference in the classical the-
ory T .
Let G be a finite set of assessment in LR, and NR(G ) be a coherent set of
desirable gambles in TR. The lower prevision of a gamble f ∈LR is defined as
ER( f ) := sup
γ0∈R,λi∈R+
γ0
s.t :
f − γ01R−
|G |
∑
i=1
λigi ∈L ≥R ,
(56)
16 For example, in Finance the tradeable gambles are usually piecewise polynomials. An European
call option on the future value x of an underlying security with strike k is mathematically expressed
by the gamble max(x− k,0).
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where 1R denotes the unitary gamble inLR, i.e., 1R(ω) = 1 for all ω ∈Ω. The up-
per prevision is denoted as ER( f ) =−ER(− f ). Comparing (3) and (56), the reader
can notice that f−γ01−∑|G |i=1λigi ∈L ≥ in (3) becomes f−γ01R−∑|G |i=1λigi ∈L ≥R
in (56).
Since the inclusion in L ≥ is a weaker constraint then the inclusion in L ≥R ,
we have that ER( f ) ≤ E( f ). However, since LR is a linear subspace of L that
includes all constant gambles, with L ≥R =L
≥ ∩LR, and NR(G ) is coherent (in
T ), we therefore have that, for every f ∈LR
TR
ER( f ) =
T
E( f ) ≤
T
E( f ) =
TR
ER( f ),
meaning that ER( f ) can be interpreted as a lower expectation. In particular, this
tell us that, from an operational point of view, TR works exactly as T .
The same can also be observed by looking at characteristics of the dual of a
coherent set in TR. Indeed, assumeLR is a closed subspace ofL . Then, endowed
with the relative topology, the continuous linear functions on LR are exactly the
restriction to LR of the continuous linear functionals on L [42, Theorem 5.87].
AsLR includes all constant gambles, by the Riesz-Kantorovich extension theorem,
any positive functional onLR can be extended (possibly non uniquely) to a positive
functional on L . This means that, given the correspondence in Theorem 6, the
dual of a set KR coherent in TR can be identified with the closed convex set of
probability charges (N(KR))•.
To conclude, whenever the subspaceLR is clear and Theorem 6 holds, we can
identify T and TR.
C Technicalities for Section 3.1
Define
f ≤B g := g− f ∈ Σ≥ (57)
Lemma 3. Assume that Σ≥ includes all positive constant gambles. Then it holds
that
f ≥B 0⇔ f +δ ≥B 0,∀δ > 0. (58)
Proof. Direction from left to right follows from δ ∈ Σ≥ and posiΣ≥ = Σ≥. Direc-
tion from right to left follows from clΣ≥ = Σ≥.
As usual, the natural extension operator is defined as NB(G ) := cl(posi(G ∪
Σ≥)). In what follows we provide some characterisation of P-coherence.
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Proposition 9. Assume that Σ≥ includes all positive constant gambles. Let G ⊆LR
a set of assessments. The following are equivalent
1. −1R /∈ posi(G ∪Σ≥)
2. posi(G ∪Σ≥)∩Σ< = /0
3. NB(G ) is P-coherent
Proof. We start by proving the equivalence between the last two points. For the re-
maining equivalences, first of all, notice that posi(G ∪Σ≥) ⊆ clposi(G ∪Σ≥) ⊆
NB(G ). Hence, (3) implies (2). Assume that (2) holds, and assume f + δ ∈
posi(G ∪Σ≥), for every δ > 0. This means f ∈ cl(posi(G ∪Σ≥)). Suppose f <B 0.
By Lemma 3, we have f + δ <B 0, for some δ > 0, that is f + δ ∈ Σ<, a con-
tradiction. We therefore conclude that f 6<B 0, and that cl(posi(G ∪Σ≥)), which
includes G , is coherent in T ?. For the remaining equivalences, clearly (1) implies
(2). Now, assume f ∈ Σ< and f ∈ posi(G ∪ Σ≥). Hence, − f is in the interior
of Σ≥, meaning that for some δ > 0, − f − δ = g ∈ Σ≥. From this we get that
−1R = g+ fδ ∈ posi(G ∪Σ≥).
Analogously to T , one can ask if and when NB is a closure operator whose
class of non-trivial closed sets coincide with the P-coherent sets, or stated other-
wise, if and when NB associates to each C ⊆LR the intersection of all P-coherent
sets that include C . It turns out that we need to add some conditions to the struc-
tural properties of T ? to obtain such property:
Proposition 10. Assume that Σ≥ includes all positive constant gambles, and more-
over that
(*) for every f ∈LR, there is ε > 0 such that f + ε ∈ Σ≥.
Let G ⊆LR a set of assessments. The following are equivalent
1. NB(G ) is P-coherent
2. NB(G ) 6=LR
Proof. Since (1) implies (2), we need to verify the other direction. Assume NB(G )
is not P-coherent. By Proposition 9, −1 ∈ NB(G ), and thus −ε ∈ NB(G ), for every
ε ≥ 0. Let f ∈LR. By (*) there is ε > 0 such that f + ε ∈ Σ≥ ⊆ NB(G ). Hence,
by closure under linear combinations, f + ε+(−ε) = f ∈ NB(G ).
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Notice that condition (*) is satisfied by the P-coherent model T ? of QM in-
troduced in Section 4, as well as by the model of Section 6. On the other hand,
(*) is not the only condition to force the equivalence between the two claims in
Proposition 10. One could have indeed added the condition that ≤ coincides on
Σ≥ with the order ≤B17 We plan for future work to study the natural condition on
Σ≥ related to the property for NB to be the closure operator induced by P-coherent
sets.
In what follows, we prove the main theorem of the paper.
PROOF OF THEOREMS 2. Assume that Σ≥ includes all positive constant gambles
and that it is closed (inLR). Let C ⊆LR be a P-coherent set of desirable gambles.
We have to verify that the following statements are equivalent:
1. C includes a negative gamble that is not in Σ<.
2. posi(L ≥∪G ) is incoherent, and thusP is empty
3. C ◦ is not (the restriction toLR of) a closed convex set of mixtures of classi-
cal evaluation functionals.
4. The extension C • of C ◦ in the space M of all charges in Ω includes only
signed charges (quasi-probabilities).
First of all, notice that the restriction to LR of the set of all normalised charges
that correspond to a bounded linear functionals coincides with C •. Given this, the
equivalence between (3) and (4) is immediate, whereas the equivalence between (2)
and (4) is given by Theorem 5. We finally verify the equivalence between (1) and
(3). In this case, the direction from left to right being obvious, the other direction
is due to the fact that g≤ f , for every g ∈ C and f ∈ posi(L ≥∪C )\C .
The next result provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence
of a P-coherent set of desirable gambles satisfying each claim of Theorem 2.
Proposition 11. Assume thatLR includes all positive constant gambles and Σ≥ is
closed (inLR). The following two claims are equivalent
◦ there is a P-coherent set of desirable gambles C ⊆LR that includes a neg-
ative gamble that is not P-negative
◦ Σ≥ (L ≥R
17Stated otherwise, for every f ,g ∈ Σ≥, if f ≤ g then f ≤B g.
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D Technicalities for Subsection 7.5
In this section we discuss how to exploit the correspondence with the system intro-
duced in [25] in the aim of deriving the remaining three axioms of QT.
Recall that a subset H n×n is said to be coherent if it is a convex cone C con-
taining the set {G ∈H n×n : G  0} of all PSD matrices in H n×n and disjoint
from the interior of {G ∈H n×n : G≤ 0}. We know that there is a bijective corre-
spondence between closed convex sets of density matrices and coherent subsets of
ofH n×n, but also between closed convex sets of density matrices and P-coherent
sets of gambles. By looking at such correspondences, it is then immediate to verify
that:
Proposition 12. The map f : C 7→ {G ∈H n×n | x†Gx ∈ C } is a bijection between
coherent subsets ofH n×n and P-coherent sets of gambles.
Based on this correspondence, we can thus exploit the results in [25] to derive
Lu¨der’s rule (measurement updating) and Schro¨dinger’s rule (time evolution).
D.1 Lu¨der’s rule
It states the following:
◦ Quantum projection measurements are described by a collection {Πi}ni=1
of projection operators that satisfy the completeness equation ∑ni=1Πi = I.
These are operators acting on the state space of the system being measured.
If the state of the quantum system is ρ immediately before the measurement
then the state after the measurement is
ρˆ =
ΠiρΠi
Tr(ΠiρΠi)
,
provided that Tr(ΠiρΠi)> 0 and the probability that result i occurs is given
by pi = Tr(ΠiρΠi).
A projection-valued measurement Π∗ = {Π∗i }ni=1 can be seen as a partition of
unity {x†Π∗i x}ni=1. Thus an event “indicated” by a certain projector Πi in Π =
{Πi}ni=1 can also be seen as the function pii(x) := x†Π∗i x. The information it rep-
resents is: an experiment Π is performed and the event indicated by Πi happens.18
Under this assumption, Alice can focus on gambles that are contingent on the event
Πi: these are the gambles such that “outside” Πi no utile is received or due – status
18 We assume that the quantum measurement device is a “perfect meter” (an ideal common as-
sumption in QM), i.e., there are not observational errors – Alice can trust the received information.
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quo is maintained –; in other words, they represent gambles that are called off if the
outcome of the experiment is notΠi. Mathematically, we define Alice’s conditional
set of desirable gambles as follows.
Definition 7. Let C be an P-coherent set of gambles, the set obtained as
CΠi =
{
g(x) ∈LR | x†ΠiGΠix ∈ C
}
(59)
is called the set of desirable gambles conditional on Πi.
Notice that x†ΠiGΠix = αpii(x).
We can also compute the dual of CΠi , i.e.,QΠi , and thus obtain the
Subjective formulation of Lu¨der’s rule:
Given a closed convex set of states Q, the corresponding conditional set on
Πi is obtained as
QΠi =
{
ΠiZΠi
Tr(ΠiZΠi)
∣∣∣z ∈Q} , (60)
provided that Tr(ΠiZΠi)> 0 for every z ∈Q. Note that the latter condition
implies that pi j(x) /∈Q for any j 6= i.
The following diagram gives the relationships among C ,Q,CΠi ,QΠi .
C CΠi
Q QΠi
dual
conditioning
conditioning
dual
D.2 Time evolution postulate
It states the following:
◦ The evolution of a closed quantum system is described by a unitary transfor-
mation. That is, the state ρ of the system at time t0 is related to the state ρ ′
of the system at time t1 > t0 by a unitary operator U which depends only on
the times t0 and t1, ρ ′ =UρU†.
Let us consider the dynamics of sets of gambles at present time t0 and future
time t1 under the assumption that no information at all is received during such an
interval of time (i.e., we have a closed quantum system). The focus is on charac-
terising the coherence of sets of gambles in this time.
To this end, we add the following temporal postulate:
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B3. A temporal P-coherent transformation is a map φ(·, t1, t0) from LR to itself
that satisfies the following properties:
(i) φ(·, t0, t0) is the identity map;
(ii) φ(·, t1, t0) is onto;
(iii) φ(L +, t1, t0) =L +;
(iv) φ(·, t1, t0) is linear and constant preserving.
The rationale behind these conditions is the following.
Condition (i) is obvious.
Condition (ii) is a way of stating that sets of desirable gambles are only estab-
lished at present time t0, since any gamble g1 at time t1 corresponds to an element
g0 at time t0.
Condition (iii) means that no further information is received from time t0 to
time t1.
Finally, condition (iv) states in particular once again that the utility scale is
linear.
By [25][Theorem A.9] and the fact that f is a bijection preserving coherence,
the temporal P-coherence postulate (B3) leads to the following:
Subjective formulation of the time evolution postulate of QT:
(1) All the transformations φ(·, t1, t0) defined above are of the following form
g(x)
φ
↪−→ h(x) = x†(U†GU)x,
for some unitary or anti-unitary matrix U ∈H n×n, which only depends on
the times t1, t0 and is equal to the identity for t1 = t0.
(2) The transformation φ(·, t1, t0) preserves P-coherence:
if C0 is P-coherent, then C1 = {g(x) ∈LR | x†(U†GU)x ∈ C0} is also P-coherent.
By exploiting duality, we can also reformulate the above results in terms of
sets of states and derive the time evolution postulate as a direct consequence of
temporal P-coherence.
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